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Abstract
Recent research has separately uncovered that stock ownership strongly correlates with both
expectations and realizations of stock market returns, as well as with measures of ￿nancial
literacy, ability or trust. This paper reconciles all, and reports new ￿ndings from a unique
survey containing individual level data on both expectations and (knowledge of) realizations for
a representative sample by age and wealth. Stock market participation monotonically increases
with the conditional expectation of a positive stock market return, even among the a› uent and
the young. Information is very heterogeneous, increases with age and own past experience, and
identi￿es a causal e⁄ect of expectations on stock ownership. JEL Codes: D12, D83, D84, G11.
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Prior to the 2008 ￿nancial crisis, nonparticipation in risky asset markets was awarded the status
of ￿ ￿nancial mistake￿ , with potentially large consequences for equilibrium asset prices and the
equity premium.1 The ￿ nonparticipation￿puzzle uncovers the fact that a signi￿cant fraction of
households hold no risky assets despite of their historical excess average returns over riskless assets,
or ￿ equity premium￿(Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995), against elementary theory predictions from
standard expected utility maximization models (Arrow, 1965; Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969).
To date, and since the educated and the wealthier are more likely to participate, information and
transaction costs remain the most important quantitatively (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Haliassos and
Michaelides, 2003). But several questions remain, like (i) the substantial heterogeneity in portfolio
allocations (Curcuru, Heaton, Lucas and Moore, 2010), (ii) the nonparticipation of the wealthiest
(Heaton and Lucas, 2000), or (iii) the precise nature of information costs.
Recently uncovered factors such as cognitive ability (Christelis, Jappelli and Padula, 2010;
Grinblatt, Keloharju and Linnainmaa, 2011), trust (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008), ￿nancial
literacy (van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie, 2011; Lusardi, Michaud and Mitchell, 2012), ￿ ￿nancial
awareness￿(Guiso and Jappelli, 2005), (time spent in acquiring) ￿nancial information (Guiso and
Jappelli, 2007) or social interactions (Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004) are shaping our understand-
ing of the nature and importance of ￿nancial information costs. However the precise mechanism
whereby di⁄erences in (ability to process, access to or in the actual stock of) ￿nancial information
translate into di⁄erences in stock market participation remains elusive (Grinblatt, Keloharju and
Linnainmaa, 2011).2 This paper contributes to all the aforementioned open questions, by showing
that di⁄erences in information3 a⁄ect participation behaviour through their impact on stock market
return expectations, and thereby reconciles investor behaviour with traditional models in ￿nancial
economics.4
1The more so, the larger the fraction of the wealthiest risk-tolerant households that does not participate, since
the aggregate demand for risky assets disproportionately depends on them. And even amongst the wealthiest,
nonparticipation remains strikingly high. See Campbell (2006), and Guiso and Sodini (2012) for a comprehensive
review of the literature.
2Recent theoretical contributions predict that, faced with the same set of arbitrage free asset prices, those have the
most to gain from acquiring information are those who would bene￿t the most from participating and should therefore
be more informed (Cabrales, Gossner and Serrano, 2013). Under heterogeneous beliefs however, non-participants are
those who face the highest cost per unit of expected posterior return, and should therefore be the least well informed
(Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010).
3Our novel information measure better corresponds to the notion of ￿ crystallized intelligence￿in cognitive psychol-
ogy, than to the notion of ￿ ￿ uid intelligence￿ , both ￿rst identi￿ed by Raymond Cattell (1971). While ￿ uid intelligence
correlates with measures of abstract reasoning and puzzle solving, crystallized intelligence relies on abilities that
depend on speci￿c, acquired knowledge and is thus more amenable to change as new facts are learnt. We are grateful
to Bob Willis for pointing out the distinction.
4Static (Arrow, 1965) or dynamic (Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969) elementary portfolio choice models predict
that, conditional on the investor being aware of a positive equity premium, a positive amount of the risky asset be
optimally held irrespective of their risk tolerance. See Segal and Spivak (1990) or Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) for
further details.
1But the crisis, that has so far lead to the ￿Great Recession￿ , is also shaking the foundations of
macro-economics (Hall, 2010). At the heart of the debate, is the role of expectations in state-of-
the-art macro-economic models (Woodford, 2013), and in particular, in their ￿nancial counterparts
(Stiglitz, 2011). The standard practice has been to adopt the rational expectations (RE) para-
digm, whereby households hold a (common) statistically correct unbiased view of the future. RE
have a crucial advantage: rather than attempting the di¢ cult task of measuring expectations,
they can be inferred from (past equilibrium) realizations. Because the stock market is a public
non-manipulable event, under RE di⁄erences in household ￿nancial choices cannot be explained by
di⁄erences in what they expect, only by di⁄erences in either what they want (preferences) or, in
what they have (endowments) when participation is costly. Against this received wisdom, the im-
portance of (heterogeneous) subjective expectations in ￿nancial markets5 has been ascertained from
evidence gathered (i) in laboratory experiments (Hommes, 2011), (ii) from agent-based computa-
tional algorithms (Arthur, 2006), or (iii) from survey data (Pesaran and Weale, 2006; Greenwood
and Schleifer, 2013), among others. To measure households￿stock market return expectations, here
we report novel survey based evidence collected in March 2007, before the ￿nancial crisis.
An incipient strand of research in survey expectations, reviewed in Hurd (2009), uncovers that
households￿expectations regarding the future evolution of the stock market are: (i) for the majority,
no better than a 50-50 chance that the stock market index will go up in the year ahead, albeit (ii)
extremely heterogeneous (Dominitz and Manski, 2007 and 2011; KØzdi and Willis, 2011); (iii)
able to explain di⁄erences in ￿nancial choices both at a point in time, and through the life-cycle
(Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Hurd, van Rooij and Winter, 2011; Miniaci and Pastorello, 2010),
and (iv) able to identify households￿implicit risk preferences, when combined with data on ￿nancial
choices (KØzdi and Willis, 2009). These novel contributions rest on the methodological corner stone
put by Dominitz and Manski (1997) and on Manski (2004), who advocate for treating expectations
as primitives of the model, and undertake probabilistic elicitation to obtain quantitative measures
of individual expectations in surveys.6 So far, survey data has been exploited for (i) stock market
investors only (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2004), for (ii) a speci￿c population subgroup which includes
non-stockholders (by age, Dominitz and Manski, 2007, 2011; KØzdi and Willis, 2009) and for (iii) a
representative (internet) sample of the population by age and wealth ((Hurd et al., 2011); Miniaci
and Pastorello, 2010). Here, we exploit data from a new wave of the Taylor-Nelson Sofres French
survey (TNS 2007), which contains information on attitudes, preferences, subjective expectations,
(a novel proxy for) individual information and socio-economic and demographic characteristics for
a representative sample of 3,826 households, by age and wealth.
We contribute to this literature methodologically, since we elicit belief probability densities
both prospectively (expectations) and retrospectively (information sets) for the ￿rst time, and over
5The very same concern has been acknolwedged in macreocnomics since very early and until today: see for example
the contributions to the volumes edited by R. Frydman and E. S. Phelps (1983, 2013).
6But in line with (and beyond) previous work, e.g. Keane and Runkle (1990), where exploiting data on survey
expectations (and information sets) allows the researcher to overcome the di¢ cult identi￿cation problem of unbundling
the test of the model behavioural equations from the test of the model assumed expectations formation mechanism.
2a longer forecasting horizon (Pesaran and Weale, 2006) for a representative sample by asset classes,
age and wealth (Campbell, 2006). Extending probabilistic elicitation techniques to obtain a quanti-
tative measure of individual information sets is crucial, because "...little is known about what kind
of information rational-expectations investors should learn. Since information learned determines
which assets are invested in [...]" (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). We ￿nd (i) less 50-50
percent responses to probability questions, possibly conveying absolute uncertainty, at the expense
of more answers conveying absolute certainty, i.e. 0 (￿ no chance￿ ) and 100 (￿ for sure￿ ) type of an-
swers; that (ii) average ￿ve-year ahead probabilistic stock market forecasts appear hump-shaped in
age, are higher for males and increase with total wealth, and (iii) monotonically increase with the
probability of holding stocks but not with educational attainment. (iv) Our measure of information,
when averaged across individuals, is also hump-shaped in age (King and Leape, 1987), is higher for
males, and (unconditionally) increases with total wealth. Finally, (v) the conditional cross-sectional
average of ￿ve-year ahead probabilistic stock market forecasts also appears hump-shaped in age.
From the perspective of life-cycle (heterogeneous) portfolio choice models, these novel empirical
facts appear consistent with (i) observed age-portfolio pro￿les at the extensive margin, uncovering
(ii) heterogeneity in information sets as a novel source of heterogeneity in portfolio allocations
(Curcuru, Heaton, Lucas and Moore, 2010; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011).
Conditioning on risk preferences, endowments, constraints, inertial/delegation factors and infor-
mation, we ￿nd that subjective expectations determine stock market participation (i) amongst the
elderly, con￿rming the robustness of Dominitz and Manski￿ s (2007) ￿ndings, but (ii) not amongst
the young, for whom information appears instead crucial (King and Leape, 1987; Hurd, 2009).
Our measure of information is consistent with information being costly acquired (Peress, 2004;
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010), gathered from social interactions (Hong et al., 2004) and
specialised (Cabrales and Gottardi, 2011) media (Carroll, 2003), and increases with own￿ s past ex-
perience (￿ frequence of recent trades￿or household trade intensity, Linnainmaa 2011; Malmendier
and Nagel, 2011; Seru, Shumway and Sto⁄man, 2009) and age. Optimists and income constrained
respondents appear worse informed, consistent with rational inattention (Sims, 2003; Huang and
Liu, 2007). However, information does not (conditionally) increase with the respondents￿own or
parents￿educational attainment, family background, total wealth or respondents￿preferences for
either risk (Cabrales, Gossner and Serrano, 2013) or time. Most importantly, (iii) when we inter-
pret our novel information measure as an instrumental variable, we ￿nd evidence in support of a
causal e⁄ect of expectations on participation decisions, in line with elementary portfolio choice the-
ory predictions (Arrow, 1965; Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969; and under incomplete information,
Genotte, 1986).7 Hence, and although households do have limited information, they appear to act
rationally upon it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the methodology used
to elicit expectations and individual information sets. Given the aforementioned di⁄erences, we
7Here we abstract from non-expected utility models (ex. Dow and Werlang, 1992), and focus only on the consis-
tency of household choices whithin a subjective expected utility framework.
3construct measures of expectations similar to Dominitz and Manski (2007) to assess the quality of
our data against the 2004 wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS 2004), which contains
a much larger sample of households. In section 3 we describe the TNS 2007 data set and provide
descriptive statistics. Section 4 reports the main empirical results on stock market participation,
while section 5 inspects the mechanism. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring Expectations and Information
2.1 Survey Design
In surveys, respondents are asked to state their perception of a future event in order to understand
if it determines their current behaviour. The recent literature on measuring expectations privileges
the use of probability questions rather than eliciting point expectations or the traditional qualitative
approach of attitudinal research (Manski, 2004). Answers to such questions are used to understand
if expectations and outcomes are related, and to evaluate if individual behaviour changes in response
to changes in expectations. Dominitz and Manski (2007) elicit individuals￿expectations of stock
market returns inquiring about how ￿ well￿the respondent thinks the economy will do in the year
ahead (Positive Nominal Return, PNR). They exploit data for a representative sample of the elderly
from the 2004 wave of the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
To validate our dataset, we build upon their work and extend it along di⁄erent dimensions.
First, by extending the forecasting horizon to ￿ve years, we intend to untie expectational answers
from the bussiness-cycle conditions prevailing at the time of the survey (March 2007) to better
capture (i) the historic average upward trend of the stock market index, and (ii) inertia in portfolio
management (Bilias et al., 2010). The latter is important since it remains an open question with
which horizon households invest in the stock market. Second, and to comply with limitations of
survey administration (￿ll-in questionnaires as opposed to telephone interviews in the HRS), we
extend the methodology of the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the
Bank of Italy (Guiso et al., 1996) to the stock market. Probability densities are elicited on seven
points of the outcome space, instead of just two points of the cumulative distribution functions
(cdfs.), to obtain more precise individual estimates of the relevant moments. Third, we exploit
data from a representative sample by age, wealth and asset classes to examine the relationship
between age-portfolio pro￿les and subjective expectations at the extensive margin. Finally and
most importantly, probabilistic elicitation of recent past stock market performance (past Positive
Nominal Return, pPNR) provides a quantitative measure of households￿degree of awareness regard-
ing their investment opportunity set, to capture: (i) di⁄erences in information across households
(Guiso and Jappelli, 2005), and (ii) the relationship between information and expectations (Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). Without it, households who do not invest because they expect
the stock market to burst over the given forecasting horizon are indistinguishable from those who
do not invest because they are (pessimistic and) unaware of the investment opportunities available
in the stock market.
4The new wave of the Taylor-Nelson Sofres French survey (TNS 2007) was designed by researchers
at the Paris School of Economics (PSE), and administered by Taylor-Nelson Sofres, a professional
agency paid with research funds from the Agence Nationale pour la Recherche (ANR). The ￿rst
wave, carried in 2002, had no questions related to stock market expectations. The 2007 wave
contains very detailed information on attitudes, preferences and expectations, in addition to wealth,
income and socio-economic and demographic characteristics for a representative sample of French
households. A questionnaire was sent to 4,000 individuals, corresponding to an equivalent number
of households. Respondents had to ￿ll the questionnaire, and return it by the post in exchange
of around e25 in coupon-tickets (bons-d￿ achat). 3,826 respondents sent their questionnaires back,
representing a 97% response rate.
The survey was conducted in March 2007. Figure 1 below shows that after a drop of nearly 60%
in the French stock market Index (CAC-40)8 caused by the ￿ dot-com crash￿of 2001, by the time the
survey was conducted, the stock market index had been steadily recovering since the mid 2003. In
March 2007 the index was still below its ￿ dot-com￿peak. Hence, it is likely that respondents were
particularly aware of the stock market evolution regarding the past, and provide very heterogeneous
and uncertain answers regarding the stock market prospects for the ￿ve years to come, given the
recent experience of a bust and a boom.
 t = (TNS - 2007 Survey time)
CAC-40 = 5634 (30/03/2007)
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Figure 1: French Stock Market Index CAC-40 between July 1987 and July 2011. The survey was conducted
in March 2007. Source: Author￿ s own calculations from MSN Money hsitorical data.
Since the survey was conducted in March 2007, exploiting available public information from
monthly data between July 1987 and March 2007 yields the relevant sample moments ￿ = 0:023
(￿(5) = 0:108) and ￿ = 0:10 (￿(5) = 0:19) of nominal yearly (and 5-year rolling) log returns on the
8The CAC-40 takes its name from the Paris Bourse￿ s (today called Euronext Paris) early automation system
"Cotation AssistØe en Continu" (Continuous Assisted Quotation). Its base value of 1,000 was set on the 31
st of
December 1987, equivalent to a market capitalisation of 370,437,433,957.70 FF.
5CAC-40.9 Conditional on (continuously compounded) returns (on a buy-and-hold portfolio track-
ing/mimicking the index) being normally distributed, those sample moments would characterize
the subjective beliefs of those respondents who base them on the history of observed stock market
index monthly closing values.10
2.2 Expectations
To measure expectations, we elicited households￿subjective beliefs regarding the likely evolution of
the stock market index ￿ve years ahead in time, It+5; relative to March 2007, It; from the following
questions (translated wording):
C6. ￿ Five years from now, do you think that the stock market... -For each category write down the
likelihood of occurrence assigning a value between 0 and 100. The sum of all your answers must be equal to
100-:
... will have increased by more than 25%
... will have increased by 10 to 25%
... will have increased by less than 10%
... will be the same
... will have decreased by less than 10%
... will have decreased by 10 to 25%
... will have decreased by more than 25%
C7b. ￿ In your opinion, if you expect the stock market to increase within the next 5 years, which would
be the highest possible increase (as a percentage)?￿
C8b. ￿ In your opinion, if you expect the stock market to decrease within the next 5 years, which would
be the lowest possible decrease (as a percentage)?￿
Question C6 inquires household i about the subjective relative likelihood of occurrence, pi
t+1;k,
of each of the seven alternative scenarios, k = 1;:::;7. Each scenario represents a possible outcome
range for the percentage change in the index between t and t + 5, Rt+1(5) ￿
It+5
It ￿ 1.11 Questions
9The density of nominal yearly (and 5-year rolling) log returns on the CAC-40 computed from monthly data
between July 1987 and July 2011 is depicted in Figure 4, panel (a) (panel (b)) in the not for publication appendix
B. The distribution has sample moments ￿ = 0:034 (￿(5) = 0:109) and ￿ = 0:093 (￿(5) = 0:188).
10Those respondents are also more likely to form a rational expectation, at least from the perspective of the adaptive
learning literature. See for example Evans and Honkapohja (2001), where they characterize the general conditions
under which, even if individuals are initially uncertain about the underlying structure of the economy, they can end
up learning it in the limit from equilibrium realizations.
11We follow the standard convention in ￿nance for long-horizon returns, and let 1+Rt+1(s) denote the stock market
index gross return over s periods ahead (hence the subindex t+1), which is equal to the product of the s single-period
(or yearly) returns:
1 + Rt+1(s) =
s￿1 Q
f=0
(1 + Rt+1+f) =
s￿1 Q
f=0
￿
It+1+f
It+f
￿
Similarly, we let 1+Rt(s) denote the stock market index gross return over the most recent s periods from date t￿s
to date t (hence the subindex t):
1 + Rt(s) =
s￿1 Q
b=0
(1 + Rt￿b) =
s￿1 Q
b=0
￿
It￿b
It￿1￿b
￿
See Campbell et al. (1997) for details.
6C7b and C8b provide subjective upper and lower bounds for the index percentage change, Ri
max
and Ri
min respectively. The corresponding outcome ranges are:
Rt+1 2
8
<
:
[Ri
max;0:25)
| {z }
;
k=1
[0:25;0:10]
| {z }
;
k=2
(0:10;0)
| {z }
;
k=3
f0g
|{z}
;
k=4
(0;￿0:10)
| {z }
;
k=5
[￿0:10;￿0:25]
| {z }
;
k=6
(￿0:25;￿Ri
min]
| {z }
;
k=7
9
=
;
and households￿subjective likelihoods are accordingly:
pi
t+1;k ￿ Pr i [Rt+1 2 k] = Pr i
￿
It+5
It
￿ 1 2 k
￿
;8i
Out of the 3,826 sample respondents, around 63% (2,406) meaningfully answered to the expec-
tations question. 328 cases are excluded as the sum of their answers do not round up to 100.12
Figure 2 below depicts the histogram, which averages the individual probability density functions of
those who answered.13 On average, households appear more pessimistic and less uncertain (Table
2) than the historical record until March 2007 would predict.
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Figure 2: Histogram of average individual answers to the likelihood of the di⁄erent scenarios regarding
5-year ahead stock market performance. Source: TNS 2007 survey.
To validate our novel survey data, and for comparison purposes, we construct from respondents￿
answers Dominitz and Manski￿ s (2007) Positive Nominal Return (PNR) variable which captures
12Missing and erroneous answers are regressed against stockholding status, and a set of covariates (gender, marital
status, education, risk preference) using a probit (Table 1 in the not for publication appendix B).
13The four panels ((a) - (d)) in Figure 2 in the not-for publication appendix B illustrate how do elicited probability
density functions look like for a small subset of individuals.
7the 5-year ahead percentage chance of a positive nominal return 14:
8i : PNRi ￿ Pr i [Rt+1(5) > 0] = Pr i
h
It+5
It ￿ 1 2 [3
k=1 fkg
i
= pi
t+1;1 + pi
t+1;2 + pi
t+1;3
Figure 3 below, depicts the frequency distribution of responses, for ages in the 50-80 age bracket
(panel (a)) and for all ages (panel (b)). Despite of the age di⁄erences, the similarities with both
the HRS or the De Nederlandsche Bank Household Survey (DHS), exploited by Hurd et al. (2011),
are striking: (i) there is similar hipping of responses around round numeric probability answers.
(ii) For all ages, the mean response is 46.5%, while for the elderly, it is 47.1%. This compares
with a 49% mean response, for the 50-80 HRS 2004 respondents, and with a 41.6% (50.1%) for
a representative internet sample of the DHS 2004 (2006) respondents. However, hipping is much
stronger in the {0,100} answers, than in the 50 percent chance response, indicating less epistemic
uncertainty according to Bruine de Bruin et al. (2000).15 For all ages, 31% (21%) gave answers
consistent with absolute certainty that the index would go down (up) over the coming 5 years.
Evidence from the empirical ￿nance literature on long horizon returns suggests that the longer
time horizon given to evaluate stock market performance might explain the di⁄erences, because of
mean-reversion (Campbell et al., 1997). In the next subsection we further examine this question.
Figure 3: PNR by age groups, frequency distribution. Source: TNS 2007.
Consistent with the ￿ndings reported in Dominitz and Manski￿ s (2007) Table 1, the (conditional)
mean percentage chance of a positive nominal return is higher for respondents who are married
and for males.16 In line with the HRS 2002 ￿ndings by KØzdi and Willis (2009), expectations
14 In Dominitz and Manski (2007), 15,166 HRS respondents, aged 50 to 80 in 2004, were asked:
Positive Nominal Return (PNR): We are interested in how well you think the economy will do in the next year. By
next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares invested in blue chip stocks like those in
the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be worth more than they are today?
8i : PNR
i
DM ￿ Pr
i
h
It+1
It ￿ 1 2 [
3
k=1 fkg
i
15Kleinjans and Van Soest (2013) explicitly model (six) anomalies in the HRS ￿ reporting behaviour￿and ￿nd that
incorporating them has small e⁄ects on the estimated distribution of the genuine subjective probabilities.
16Table 2 in the not for publication appendix C reports the distribution of responses and the response rate condi-
tioning on age, gender, and marital and stockholding status.
8(noisily) increase with the respondent￿ s education and households￿total wealth. The most a› uent
households (with wealth above the 90th percentile, e413,476) appear more optimistic regarding
the future evolution of the stock market. However, respondents with some college education or
more are only slightly more optimistic than those having at most completed high school, while
both become similarly more optimistic as they age.17
Finally, expectations of a positive nominal return appear roughly hump-shaped in age, as does
the response rate to the probabilistic question. In Figure 4, the mean response increases until the
late 40s, when expectations reach its peak, only to decline from the mid 60s, although the pattern is
very noisy with potential time/cohort e⁄ects present.18 The mean percentage chance of a positive
nominal return is estimated to increase (fall) by about 8 to 12 (5 to 6) percentage points as age
increases (decreases) from 20 to 50 (late 60s onwards).
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Figure 4: Mean PNR, conditional on age. Source: TNS 2007.
Standard life-cycle portfolio choice models predict that, conditional on being aware of the exis-
tence of a historical equity premium, the young should invest heavily in the stock market to take
advantage and quickly accumulate wealth (Guiso et al., 2002; Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Gomes
and Michaelides, 2005).19 The descriptive evidence reported here suggests that expectations vary
systematically with age, and that both the young and the elderly appear particularly pessimistic.
Although the evidence is consistent with existing ￿ndings for the elderly in the US, in France the
17Figures 6 and 7 in the not for publication appendix C display kernel-smoothed estimates of the mean percentage
chance of a positive nominal return conditional on total wealth and educational attainement, respectively.
18In line with the ￿ndings reported by Linnainmaa (2011) or Malmendier and Nagel (2011), comparison of Figure 4
(expectations) with Figure 9 (information) in the next subsection suggests that the time e⁄ects possibly correspond to
respondents overweighting a particular event in the past to which they were exposed, like the burst of the technology
bubble in 2002.
19Except if labour income and dividends were cointegrated (Benzoni et al., 2007), in which case even if the young
were aware of the historical equity premium, they would be willing to short stocks. Intuitively, the young would be
implicitly over-exposed to stock market risk through their human capital investments (the returns of) which are non-
diversi￿able and highly correlated with dividends in the long run, i.e. the longer the available (life-cycle) investment
horizon.
9young appear pessimistic rather than optimistic (Dominitz and Manski, 2011; Vissing-Jorgensen,
2003).
2.3 Measuring Information
Another possibility is that the young are particularly unaware of the investment opportunities of-
fered by the stock market (King and Leape, 1987; Hurd, 2009). Recent studies stress the importance
of (i) coginitive ability (Christelis et al., 2010; Grinblatt et al., 2011), of (ii) the stock of speci￿c
knowledge, like ￿nancial literacy20 (van Rooij et al., 2011), or of (iii) measures of sources of (ex.
social interactions, Hong et al. (2004); time spent in acquiring ￿nancial information, Guiso and
Jappelli (2006); frequency of and gains/losses in recent stock market operations, Linnainmaa, 2011)
or lack of access to (ex. lack of trust, Guiso et al., 2008) that speci￿c knowledge, when accounting
for stock market participation decisions. Here, we are more speci￿c and inquire respondents about
the most recent stock market return realization over the relevant forecasting horizon, in line with
the ￿nance literature (e.g. Biais, Bossaerts and Spatt, 2010; Campbell et al., 1996; Malmendier
and Nagel, 2011; Zhang, 2006).
To that purpose, we inquired respondents about the likely evolution of the stock market index
over the ￿ve years prior (It￿5) to the time of the survey (March 2007), It; as follows (translated
wording):
C9. ￿ Over the past ￿ve years, do you think that the stock market... -For each category write down the
likelihood of occurrence assigning a value between 0 and 100. The sum of all your answers must be equal to
100-:
... has increased by more than 25%
... has increased by 10 to 25%
... has increased by less than 10%
... has remained the same
... has decreased by less than 10%
... has decreased by 10 to 25%
... has decreased by more than 25%
Question C9 inquires household i about the subjective relative likelihood of occurrence, pi
t;k, of
each of the seven alternative scenarios, k = 1;:::;7. Each scenario represents a possible outcome
range for the percentage change in the index between t ￿ 5 and t, Rt(5) ￿ It
It￿5 ￿ 1. Since ranges
k = 1 and k = 7 are unbounded, we set (Rmax;Rmin) to match observed values.The outcome ranges
for Rt are therefore identical to those of question C6 described above. Accordingly, households￿
subjective likelihoods are given by:
pi
t;k ￿ Pr i [Rt 2 k] = Pr i
￿
It
It￿5
￿ 1 2 k
￿
;8i
20Financial literacy studies ask both general numeracy questions, which proxy for individual ability, and speci￿c
questions regarding elementary notions about the working of ￿nancial markets, which measure the stock of individual
knowledge. See Lusardi (2008) for a detailed explanation.
10Five years prior to the time when the survey was conducted (March 2002), the stock market
index was around half-way down the ￿ dot-com￿bust. But, from the beginning of March 2002 (CAC
40 = 4688:02) until the beginning of March 2007 (CAC 40 = 5634:16), the index had increased an
overall 20.2%. Therefore, the truth belongs to category k = 2; "[the stock market]...has increased by
10 to 25%": Figure 5 illustrates the wanderings of the CAC-40 index between 1987 and 2011.
Figure 5: The French Stock Market Index CAC-40 between July 1987 and July 2011. Between March 2002
and March 2007 (5 years prior to the time of the survey) the index had increased by around 20%. Source:
Author￿ s calculations from MSN Money monthly data, available online.
To capture (i) heterogeneity in accessing/processing public information and (ii) the relationship
with answers to forward-looking probability questions (Dominitz and Manski, 2011), information
regarding past stock market performance is elicited as a probability density function. While the
mean response conveys what most likely happened according to the respondent, the dispersion of the
probability mass convenes the respondent￿ s subjective degree of reliability in the respondent￿ s mean
response. According to Figure 5, a perfectly informed individual should allocate all probability mass
(100 points) to the outcome range "...has increased by 10 to 25%" (k = 2).21 Out of the 3,826 sample
respondents, around 59% (2,253) provided a meaningful answer to the information question.22
Figure 6 below depicts histogram of the average of the individual probability density functions.
Surprinsingly, the modal response coincides with the truth (outcome range k = 2) indicating that
respondents are on average well informed.
A striking ￿nding is that households tend to be also pessimistic regarding how well has the
stock market performed over the last ￿ve years. Although this might be due to imperfect recall
given the unusually long horizon, it might also be related to the ￿ dot-com￿bust being overweighted
on respondents￿memory (Hurd et al., 2011), even if only half the bust is inside the time window
21The panels (a) - (d) in Figure 3 in the not for publication appendix B, illustrate how do individual information
sets look like.
22322 cases are excluded as the sum of their answers do not round up to 100.
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Figure 6: Histogram of average individual answers to the relative likelihood of the di⁄erent scenarios
regarding the stock market performance over the last 5 years. Source: TNS 2007.
spanned by the question. Table 2 reports summary sample statistics for respondents￿answers re-
garding past and future stock market returns, imposing a uniform distribution within the di⁄erent
outcome ranges. Although the big spread around the sample mean realized return came as no
surprise (possibly indicating ambiguity), it is remarquable that it remains smaller than the spread
around the sample mean expected stock market return. Notice also that the cross-sectional disper-
sion of both expected and realized stock market perfomance measures is about twice the size of the
respective spreads, indicating that ￿ disagreement￿is very important, in line with the behavioural
￿nance literature (e.g. Hong and Stein, 2007).
Table 1: Sample Moments from Questions C6 (Expectations) and C9 (Information).
Variable No obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expected Return (ER) 2460 0.055311 0.112602 -0.625 1.125
Std. Dev. of ER 2460 0.068028 0.07347 0 0.43056
Mean (Realized) Past Return (pR) 2231 0.11938 0.139876 -0.375 0.375
Std. Dev. of pR 2231 0.065598 0.069211 0 0.375
Source: TNS 2007.
For consistency, we construct from respondents￿answers the past Positive Nominal Return
(pPNR) variable which captures the percentage chance of a positive nominal return between March
2002 and March 2007:
8i : pPNRi ￿ Pr i [Rt(5) > 0] = Pr i
h
It
It￿5 ￿ 1 2 [3
k=1 fkg
i
= pi
t;1 + pi
t;2 + pi
t;3
In Figure 7, we depict the frequency distribution of responses to pPNR for all ages. As pre-
viously, there is hipping of responses around round numeric probability answers indicating that
rounding is not speci￿c to forward looking questions but rather, to respondents rounding when
12confronted with the probabilistic elicitation format. For all ages, the mean response is 68%, while
the true answer is a 100% chance of a positive nominal return over the last 5 years. Around 44%
of sample respondents (990 individuals) gave an answer consistent with the truth.
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Figure 7: Percentage chance of a Positive Nominal Return over the past ￿ve years (pPNR) for all ages,
frequency distribution. Source: TNS 2007.
In Figure 8 we examine what type of information had those respondents who were absolutely
certain regarding the future evolution of the stock market (see panel (b), Figure 3). Panel (a) shows
that amongst those who were absolutely certain that the stock market would go down (24%, 567
answered PNR=0%), around 35% were absolutely certain that it had not increased over the last 5
years, while 43% were absolutely certain that it had gone up. Around 5% gave a 50 percent chance
of either going up or down. This contrasts with panel (b), for respondents who were absolutely
certain that the stock market would go up (21%, 446 answered PNR=100%): 83% were absolutely
certain that the stock market had gone up, while only 6% gave answers consistent with absolute
certainty about the stock market having gone down. Only 2% gave a 50 percent response. Hence,
individual information regarding the past contributes to (i) signi￿cantly unbundle the ￿ hipping￿
on responses conveying absolute certainty regarding the future, i.e. PNR = f0;100g, thereby (ii)
capturing a novel source of heterogeneity amogst respondents (Curcuru et al., 2010).
Table 4 in the not for publication appendix D reports the distribution of responses and the
response rate conditioning on age, gender and stockholding status23. In accordance with the ￿ndings
reported in Lusardi (2008) on the ￿nancial literacy of US adults, male respondents who are older,
single and stockholders report higher mean (and a lower standard deviation of) percentage chances
of a past positive nominal return. Although information broadly increases with age irrespective
of gender, males are better informed than females on average.24 In addition, information broadly
23Stockholders report a higher mean by about 10 percentage points, and are around 6 percentage points more likely
to give a response.
24See Figure 8 in the not for publication appendix D.
13Figure 8: pPNR conditional on PNR, for pessimists (a) and optimists (b), frequency distribution. Source:
TNS 2007.
increases until the 50th percentile of wealth (e118,792), remains constant until the 90th percentile
(e413,476), only to increase again albeit very heterogeneously.25 The richest households (with
wealth above the 90th percentile), may thus be more optimistic (and disagree more) regarding the
future investment opportunities because they are better (albeit more heterogeneously) informed.
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Figure 9: Mean percentage chance of a positive nominal return over the last 5 years (pPNR) by age. Source:
TNS 2007.
Figure 9 presents kernel-smoothed estimates of the mean percentage chance of a past positive
nominal return conditional on age. Information about past stock market performance sharply
increases with age until the mid 40s, mildly increases until the mid 70s, and then decreases, although
the point estimates are much noisier.26 In line with King and Leape￿ s (1987) conjecture and Lusardi
25However, the increased heterogeneity in information in the top decile of the wealth distribution might just be
a small sample problem, since only 272 respondents within that decile answered to the information question. See
Figure 9 for total household wealth by age in the not for publication appendix D for additional evidence.
26The mean percentage chance of a past positive nominal return is estimated to increase (fall) by about 20 to 22
14et al.￿ s (2012) structural estimations, ￿gure 9 provides evidence in support of an ￿ informational
stock￿being slowly built through respondents￿life-cycle, which (slightly) depreciates by the end
of it. Importantly, this process of life-cycle information accumulation may explain the identi￿ed
pessimism regarding the future performance of the stock market amongst the young and the elderly
(see Figure 4), providing support to the relationship between expectations and information sets
further examined below.27
Surprisingly, information about past stock market performance does not increase with own￿ s
educational attainement, although it broadly increases with age within educational groups.28 This
￿nding is con￿rmed in Table 2 below, which reports marginal e⁄ects of estimating a two-way
censored Tobit speci￿cation for answers to question C9 (censored below by ￿ 0￿ and above by
￿ 100￿ ). The likelihood of being informed is speci￿ed to be a function of age, gender, sources
of advice (friends, family, professional, broad media, specialised media) and of information (TV,
economics/￿nance emissions), own and parents￿educational attainment, family background (mid-
dle/lower/other class), endowments (income and wealth), ￿nancial decision taking (no/partial/complete
delegation of ￿nancial decisions), own past experience (proxied by the ￿ frequency of recent trades￿ ),
preferences (risk aversion and impatience), constraints in either accessing information (￿ online bank-
ing￿ ) or related to inertia in informational sources (parents￿stockownership status, ￿ parents own
stocks￿ ), and of the tightness of households￿budget constraint (￿ importance of money in life￿ ).
Categorical answers to frequency, variety and access specialised media, advice from profession-
als, as well as age or the number of stock market transactions carried over the last year, increase
the likelihood of being informed.29 Interestingly, parents￿stockownership status and educational
attainment or family background (omitted from the table) do not increase the odds of being in-
formed, and actually signi￿cantly decreases them for those who follow ￿ family advice￿ . Since those
who follow ￿ friends￿advice￿are more likely to be informed, we interpret it as being consistent with
social interactions being instrumental in gathering information (Hong et al., 2004): while friends
are a product of respondents￿choices, the family in which they are born is not. Alternatively, advice
from the family could be capturing trust, and thereby rationalize Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales￿
(2008) ￿nding regarding the negative impact of lack of trust on stock holdings. On the other hand,
a measure of optimism (￿ being lucky in life￿ ) has a negative impact on being informed, indicating
that an ￿ overcon￿dence bias￿is not present once gender is conditioned upon: although males appear
(10 to 12) percentage points as age increases until (decreases after) 75.
27As with expectations, similar event-related time e⁄ects seem to be present (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). For
example, if the information accumulation process peaks at the age of 48, a less well informed respondent aged 53 in
2007 was 48 years old in 2002 when the ￿ dot-com￿bubble burst. Hence, the apparent decline in the reported mean
realized return of the average respondent in the 48-60 age bracket appears consistent with respondents overweighting
the ￿ dot.com￿bust (and hence being rationally inattentive; Sims, 2003), and also might explain why they appear
more pessimistic regarding the future (Figure 4) if they base their expectations on such an information set (Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010).
28See Figure 10 in the not for publication appendix D.
29The positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of access to specialised media and professionals￿advice on households￿infor-
mation is consistent with the epidemiological model of Chris Carroll (2003), as well as with the existence of a market
for ￿nancial information where quality is priced, i.e. the vertical di⁄erentiation component in Cabrales and Gottardi
(2011).
15Table 2: The Determinants of Information (pPNR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 23.73*** 21.91*** 22.28*** 19.57*** 17.72***
(3.631) (3.624) (3.618) (3.744) (3.782)
Age 2.521*** 1.978*** 1.920*** 1.284* 1.267*
(0.643) (0.65) (0.65) (0.690) (0.712)
Age squared -0.0196*** -0.0146** -0.0132** -0.00840 -0.00849
(0.0065) (0.00652) (0.00656) (0.00683) (0.00702)
Friends advice 9.551** 8.791** 9.175** 8.357*
(4.427) (4.418) (4.431) (4.450)
Professional advice 3.609 3.459 2.069 -0.419
(4.091) (4.079) (4.101) (4.178)
Family advice -14.62*** -14.40*** -15.29*** -13.93***
(4.162) (4.15) (4.167) (4.204)
Media advice 0.211 -0.469 0.150 -3.743
(5.251) (5.239) (5.223) (5.210)
Specialised media advice 19.81*** 18.55*** 16.09*** 11.01**
(5.194) (5.186) (5.191) (5.260)
Information from TV -8.264* -7.293 -7.192 -7.624*
(4.528) (4.52) (4.515) (4.507)
Information from economics emissions -1.52 -0.286 -1.373 -0.625
(4.03) (4.03) (4.025) (4.036)
Education (Ref. category: High school or less)
Less than college 8.047 4.086 -1.265
(6.329) (6.361) (6.473)
College or more 22.34*** 14.68** 6.443
(6.935) (7.172) (7.456)
Log (Income) 8.797*** 8.431***
(3.262) (3.265)
Log (Total wealth) 1.377 0.312
(1.269) (1.315)
Self account management 5.892 1.457
(3.654) (3.709)
Frequency of recent trades 13.97***
(2.349)
Risk aversion (CARA) 27.71
(22.68)
Mother education (Ref. category: Less than secondary)
Secondary -2.140
(7.169)
Higher than secondary -1.731
(6.692)
Father education (Ref. category: Less than secondary)
Secondary -0.404
(6.897)
Higher than secondary -3.839
(7.484)
Importance of money in life -4.548***
(1.065)
Online banking 5.502
(4.643)
Optimism -6.622*
(3.684)
Parents own stocks 0.495
(4.192)
Temporal preference -0.818
(0.792)
Constant 30.70** 44.63*** 32.50** -47.72 -8.927
(14.91) (15.47) (16.35) (29.68) (32.38)
Log-likelihood -6530 -6507 -6499 -6530 -6507
No. of observations 2,253 2,253 2,253 2,200 2,133
Note: (i) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: TNS 2007.
16better informed, supporting more optimistic forward looking expectations, optimists appear consis-
tently worse informed.30 We do not ￿nd evidence of either temporal or risk preferences determining
information sets, in line with Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp￿ s (2010) theoretical prediction that
risk aversion does not determine the demand for information.31 Although total wealth does not in-
crease the odds of being informed, income does (even if we condition on the number of stock market
operations carried over the last year), in line with a costly information acquisition interpretation
(Peress, 2004).32
Overall, these ￿ndings are consistent with ￿nancial information being slowly acquired through
the life-cycle (King and Leape, 1987; Lusardi et. al., 2012) from own past experience (Linnainmaa,
2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), from others (Hong et al., 2004) and from specialised media
(Carroll, 2003). On the other hand, the negative e⁄ect of the ￿ importance of money in life￿ ,
which scores higher the poorer and the more ￿nancially constrained the respondent is, reveals a
novel aspect in information acquisition: disenfranchisement. Notice that the negative impact of
both disenfranchisement and optimism is consistent with rational inattention theory (Sims, 2003),
since both decrease the expected returns of costly gathering/processing publicly available relevant
information.
3 Expectations, Information and Stock Market Participation
An important puzzle in the literature is why so few households hold stocks (Haliassos and Bertaut,
1995). Table 3 reports the frequency of non-stock holders by motive for not holding stocks, as
well as their relative incidence by age groups.33 Quantitatively, the percentages reported suggest
borrowing/liquidity constraints (Guiso et al., 1996), being ￿ too risky￿and ￿ having other priorities￿
as the most important, closely followed by not trusting the stock market (Guiso et al., 2008), being
uninformed and entry/management costs being too high (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) in accounting
for overall non-participation amongst non-participants.34
30This may help reconciling Bilias et al.￿ s (2010) ￿ndings consistent with inertia in households￿portfolios (linked
to limited ressources and limited education), with Guiso and Jappelli￿ s (2006) ￿dings consistent with excess trading
even amongst the general population, if those who overtrade are also optimists (and hence, worse informed).
31Our measure of temporal preference is inversely proportional to ￿ impatience￿ , measuring how much the respondent
cares about the future (rather than a preference for an early resolution of uncertainty). This empirical ￿nding does
not contradict Cabrales, Gossner and Serrano￿ s (2013) theoretical prediction of a positive relationship between risk
tolerance and the value of information, because their prediction holds under the restriction of a common prior
(pinned-down by the set of arbitrage free asset market prices) while here we report empirical evidence consistent with
heterogeneous priors.
32In unreported regressions, we estimated an ordered probit on the number of stock market operations carried
over the previous year (grouped in 5 categories), and ￿nd evidence consistent with wealth and income increasing
the number of trades, but also with liquidity and borrowing constraints forcing households to trade at the extensive
margin. These results are available upon request.
33Question C18 inquires non-stockholders about the reasons for not holding stocks, and the following options were
given: (1) ￿ I do not have enough liquidity￿ , (2) ￿ It is too risky￿ , (3) ￿ I am poorly informed￿ , (4) ￿ I do not trust the
stock market￿ , (5) ￿ Fixed entry costs are too high￿ , (6) ￿ Management costs are too high￿ , (7) ￿ I have other priorities￿ .
34Notice that the relative importance of the di⁄erent motives changes by age group: having other priorities and
lack of trust in the stock market slightly increases with age, while being uninformed signi￿cantly decreases with age,
with the elderly being around 40% less likely not to participate than the young, amongst non-participants.
17Table 3: Reasons for not Holding Stocks, by Age (%)
All Ages Age<50 Age￿50
Whole sample Respondents Whole sample Respondents Whole sample Respondents
I am liquidity constrained 24.9 23.6 24.7 24 25 22.8
It is too risky 20.7 20.8 19.9 20.6 21.9 21.5
I am uninformed 12.8 12.9 14.5 14.9 9.4 9.3
I don￿ t trust stock market 15.8 15.9 14.8 14.7 17.2 17.9
Entry costs are too high 3.9 4.2 6.2 4.2 4 4.2
Management costs are too high 4.6 4.8 4.2 4.6 4.8 5.2
I have other priorities 17.3 17.8 15.7 17 17.7 19.1
Source: TNS 2007.
Although in an expected utility framework, the standard two-asset model predicts that decision
takers invest in the risky asset if and only if its expected return exceeds the return of the riskless
asset (Arrow, 1965; Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969), only recently have researchers started to
collect data on subjective expectations of stock market returns (Dominitz and Manski, 2007; KØzdi
and Willis, 2009; Hurd et al., 2011).35 Here we go one step further and examine the extent to which
conditional subjective expectations determine households￿stock ownership decision, conditioning
on what they know (Merton, 1987; O￿ Hara, 2003; Biais et al., 2010).
To obtain a measure of stock ownership, question C19 in the TNS 2007 inquires respondents
about the di⁄erent types of ￿nancial instruments and accounts they hold, and in particular whether
they invest in the stock market either directly or indirectly. We de￿ne direct stockholdings as the
sum of stocks of privatised public companies, listed stocks of private companies and stocks of foreign
￿rms held. Indirect stockholdings are those held through mutual funds and managed investment
accounts.36 The proportion of households who hold stocks directly is 22%, and 37% either directly
or indirectly. Although low, the participation rates are slightly higher than those obtained from
previous past surveys37 and similar to the ￿gures reported by Haliassos (2008) for other countries
at that time. In Figure 10, stock market participation amongst respondents displays a clear hump-
shaped pattern by age.
The literature on household ￿nance has found that those who are better educated, older and
wealthier, are more likely to hold stocks. Dominitz and Manski (2007) report that the probability
of holding stocks monotonically increases with the perceived chance of a positive return of investing
in the stock market amongst the elderly.38 Table 4 reproduces their Table 2, albeit exploiting data
35In particular, the decision to invest in the stock market does not depend on either preferences, endowments or
information about past stock market performance: just on the subjective expected return. See Arrow (1965) and
Segal and Spivak (1990) or Haliassos and Bertaut (1996) for a proof and clari￿cations.
36We exclude both government bonds and homeownership from the risky asset category, even if the latter are highly
illiquid and indivisible (and therefore risky), because French households mostly buy houses for the ￿ ow of services
they provide rather than as a ￿nancial investment. Still, in the estimation we control for the level of total wealth
(real plus ￿nancial) and include a dummy variable that takes value one when home-ownership status is observed.
37For the 35-55 year-olds corresponding subsample in the Patrimoine 1998 INSEE survey, the proportion of house-
holds holding risky assets ￿ directly￿is 21.6 and either directly or through mutual funds, 32.4.
38Table 3 in the not for publication appendix C shows a similar qualitative pattern emerges for the elderly (all
ages) in the TNS 2007, consistent with their ￿ndings and theoretical predictions.
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Figure 10: The probability of holding stocks and stock mutual funds, by age. Source: TNS 2007.
for all ages from the TNS 2007. Despite our sample size being substantially smaller and deploying
a di⁄erent elicitation methodology, the monotonic positive relationship between expectations and
stockholdings conditional on gender and marital status ￿rst uncovered by them appears strikingly
robust.39
Table 4: Probability of Holding Stocks or Stock Mutual Funds Conditional on Percent Chance of Positive
Nominal Return, Gender, Age and Marital Status.
Married or living with a partner NOT Married or living with a partner
Percent chance Male Female Male Female
of positive Point Standard Point Standard Point Standard Point Standard
nominal return Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error
0 0.31 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02)
1-10 0.39 (0.06) 0.35 (0.06) 0.33 (0.06) 0.29 (0.06)
11-20 0.40 (0.05) 0.36 (0.05) 0.34 (0.05) 0.30 (0.05)
21-30 0.28 (0.04) 0.25 (0.04) 0.23 (0.04) 0.20 (0.03)
31-40 0.48 (0.05) 0.44 (0.05) 0.42 (0.05) 0.37 (0.05)
41-49 0.41 (0.08) 0.37 (0.07) 0.35 (0.07) 0.30 (0.07)
50 0.42 (0.04) 0.38 (0.04) 0.35 (0.04) 0.31 (0.04)
51-59 0.24 (0.09) 0.20 (0.08) 0.19 (0.08) 0.16 (0.07)
60-69 0.49 (0.05) 0.45 (0.05) 0.42 (0.05) 0.38 (0.05)
70-79 0.56 (0.04) 0.52 (0.05) 0.49 (0.05) 0.44 (0.05)
80-89 0.55 (0.05) 0.50 (0.05) 0.48 (0.05) 0.44 (0.05)
90-99 0.52 (0.05) 0.47 (0.05) 0.45 (0.05) 0.40 (0.05)
100 0.48 (0.02) 0.44 (0.03) 0.42 (0.03) 0.37 (0.03)
All 0.40 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02) 0.34 (0.02) 0.32 (0.02)
Source: TNS 2007.
Since subjective expectations have been found to systematically vary with risk preferences, in-
formation, and demographic and socio-economic characteristics (Hurd, 2009), here we estimate the
39However, since the forecasting horizon is much longer (5 years instead of 1), the relationship appears less pro-
nounced quantitatively. In addition, the probability of stockholding is much larger for those who anticipate a 0%
chance of a positive return, and (also strangely) recedes as it increases beyond 80% (beyond 90% in Dominitz and
Manski￿ s ￿ndings, 2007).
19conditional e⁄ect of the percentage chance of a positive nominal return on stockholdings. Condi-
tioning on individual information is important for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoret-
ically, households form their expectations conditioning upon their individual information sets, ￿i.
Although in the rational expectations tradition ￿i would contain "all relevant information", here
we proxy it by the individually elicited degree of knowledge of the most recent stock market return
realization over the relevant horizon, ￿i = fRt(5)g.40 Although admittedly simplistic, minimal
information survey elicitation provides results beyond individuals overweighting more recent stock
market return realizations because of learning from experience (Linnainmaa, 2011; Malmendier
and Nagel, 2011, 2013), while uncovering a novel age-dependent imperfect knowledge fact, broadly
consistent with recent ￿ndings from the ￿nancial literacy literature (Lusardi et al., 2011, 2012).
Empirically, Dominitz and Manski (2011) or Hurd and Rohwedder (2012) conjecture that di⁄er-
ences in the way people discount publicly available information may explain much of the observed
heterogeneity in subjective expectations. Our information measure, pPNRi; precisely measures
(probabilistically) the extent to which respondents know about the most recent realized stock mar-
ket realization.41 Most importantly, the availability of observable measures of both expectations
and information sets allows us to examine whether households￿behaviour is consistent with the
theoretical prediction of elementary (static/dynamic) portfolio choice models without having to
worry about the rationality of their stock market return forecasts.
Accordingly, we estimate households￿probability of holding stocks Pr(si
t = 1
￿
￿pi
t+1;pi
t;xi) as a
function of the percentage chance of a positive nominal return (pi
t+1 ￿ PNRi),42 conditioning on
information (pi
t ￿ pPNRi), and a vector of observables xi, containing measures of (rate of) time
and risk (aversion) preference, endowments (income and total wealth), household constraints (being
40In the empirical ￿nance literature, it is typically assumed to be ￿
i = fRt(5);Rt￿1(5);:::;R0(5)g = ￿;8i: In the
rational expectations tradition, ￿
i includes also knowledge of the data generating process of stock market return
realizations, as well as of the true economic model compatible with such data generating process. However, Guesnerie
(1992) shows that common knowledge of rationality, of the model and of the data generating process are not su¢ cient
to form a rational expectations within a game-theoretic epistemic formulation encompassing Muth￿ s original model.
41Instead of attributing di⁄erences in information sets to di⁄erences in private information (e.g. amongst profes-
sional forecasters, as in Keane and Runkle, 1990), the previous section points towards rational inattention as being
instrumental (e.g. Sims, 2003).
42To obtain subjective expectations from answers to the probability question (PNR
i), Dominitz and Manski (2007)
show that if (i) stock market returns are normally distributed, with cdf. ￿(:) :
PNR
i = Pr
i [Rt+1(5) > 0] = Pr
i
￿
Rt+1(5) ￿ ￿i
￿i
> ￿
￿i
￿i
￿
= 1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿i
￿i
￿
and if (ii) a common variance is assumed, ￿i = ￿ (for example, equal to the value obtained from historical records),
then:
￿i = ￿￿￿
￿1
￿
1 ￿ PNR
i
￿
meaning that respondents reporting a higher percentage chance that the stock market will increase over the next
￿ve years (PNR
i), have a higher subjective mean return expectation (￿i), and should then be more likely to invest
in the stock market. Since we inquire about a longer investment horizon, we exploited monthly data on the CAC
40 stock market index between July 1987 and March 2007 (228 observations) to compute the standard deviation of
￿ve-year log returns to be 0:188. When inserted into the above expression, the sample average percentage chance of
a positive nominal return of 46 percent (reported in the appendix, Table 11) corresponds to a sample mean expected
return of 0:019;about ￿ve times smaller than the historical sample mean of 0:109. A respondent reporting a value of
PNR
i = 70 percent, would match the historical sample mean of 0:109.
20liquidity constrained, access to online banking), demographics (age, gender and marital status) or
inertial factors (who takes ￿nancial decisions, stocks in pay, parents own stocks or trust43) previously
found in the literature to matter at the extensive margin:
Pr(si
t = 1
￿ ￿pi
t+1;pi
t;xi) = ￿(￿t+1pi
t+1 + ￿tpi
t + ￿0xi) (1)
where ￿(:) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function, since we assume that
there is a normally distributed unobserved error term ei
t. Table 11 in the appendix reports descrip-
tive statistics for the main variables, for the whole and selected samples.
Table 5 reports the marginal e⁄ects of the probit estimation, for all ages. The variables have the
expected signs with minor di⁄erences across columns44, con￿rming the robust e⁄ect of subjective
expectations on the probability of holding stocks, conditional on heterogeneity in individual infor-
mation. Column (5) reports that an increase of 1 percentage point (pp.) in the percent chance of a
positive nominal return increases the probability of holding stocks by around 9 percent, correspond-
ing to an increase of 28:3% in the unconditional probability (from 32:1% to 41:2%).45 The e⁄ect of
information is also sizable: comparing those who were certain that the stock market had (indeed)
increased between March 2002 and March 2007 (pPNR = 100) with those who were certain that it
had not (pPNR = 0), raises the probability of holding stocks by 7:5% (relative to the unconditional
probability of 31:4%). Notice that the positive e⁄ect of information remains statistically signi￿cant
once heterogeneity in either preferences, expectations, decision taking or constraints is taken into
account, but that when omitted (column 6), it biases upwards the estimated e⁄ect of expectations
on stockownership.
In the presence of transaction costs in capital markets, households￿endowments (proxied by
income and total wealth) in￿ uence portfolio choice.46 The empirical analysis reveals that their e⁄ect
is best captured by a second order polynomial, which facilitates the comparison with existing results
in the literature (Calvet and Sodini, 2013; Guiso et al., 2003; King and Leape, 1998).47 Both have
a positive e⁄ect on participation and are statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. An increase
of 100,000 euros in mean total wealth (233,757 euros) increases the probability of participation by
9 pps., corresponding to an increase of 26% in the unconditional probability, while an increase of
10,000 euros in mean income (19,634 euros) increases the probability of stockownership by 5 pps.
43Our measure of trust di⁄ers from Guiso et al.￿ s (2008) in that TNS survey question I25 inquires the respondent
about ￿ the extent to which s/he trusts online payment systems￿ . Hence, and although our results are not directly
comparable, our measure of trust captures still the extent to which respondents ￿ trust others￿ .
44Results in Table 5 refer to both direct and indirect stockownership. But the sign and magnitude of the reported
estimates are robust to changes in the de￿nition of stockownership (only direct stockholders, Table 9 below), and to
a semi-log speci￿cation in income and total wealth (unreported, but available upon request).
45Although the e⁄ect appears too important quantitatively, it is consistent with the results reported by Hurd et al.
(2011), KØzdi and Willis (2009) or Arrondel et al. (2013) who, instead of working with the subjective probability of
a positive nominal return (PNR
i), introduce as regressors the ￿rst and second moments (￿
i;￿i) of the individually
elicited distributions, reported in Table 1.
46See King and Leape (1998) and simulated results by Cocco et al. (2005) or Haliassos and Michaelides (2003).
47In unreported regressions we replaced the second order polynomials in income and wealth for their quar-
tiles/deciles with no signi￿cant change in the estimated coe¢ cients of expectations and information. Results are
available upon request.
21Table 5: Probability of Holding Stocks or Stock Mutual Funds (All Ages)
2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Positive nominal return (PNR) 0.00185*** 0.00146*** 0.00139*** 0.00111*** 0.000908*** 0.00116*** 0.00737***
(0.000279) (0.000299) (0.000301) (0.000310) (0.000316) (0.000295) (0.002067)
Male 0.0112 0.00108 -0.000288 -0.0177 -0.0232 -0.0166 -0.0639
(0.0220) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0241) (0.0248) (0.0246) (0.0657)
Married/living with a partner 0.0572** 0.0585** 0.0688*** -0.0182 -0.0177 -0.0189 -0.0497
(0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0267) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0708)
Age 0.00789* 0.00711* 0.00603 -0.00585 0.000417 0.000944 0.00153
(0.00424) (0.00426) (0.00433) (0.00461) (0.00472) (0.00471) (0.01215)
Age squared -2.67e-05 -2.10e-05 1.34e-06 8.64e-05* 4.15e-05 3.82e-05 1.05e-04
(4.24e-05) (4.25e-05) (4.34e-05) (4.59e-05) (4.68e-05) (4.68e-05) (1.05e-04)
Past positive nominal return (pPNR) 0.00115*** 0.00105*** 0.000853** 0.000756**
(0.000321) (0.000323) (0.000333) (0.000338)
Education
(Ref. category: High school or less)
Less than college 0.115*** 0.0450 0.0358 0.0360 0.1120
(0.0396) (0.0417) (0.0423) (0.0423) (0.1167)
College or more 0.256*** 0.113** 0.0710 0.0727 0.1961
(0.0438) (0.0484) (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.1299)
Income (10E-6) 7.204*** 5.027** 5.071** 11.70*
(2.300) (2.455) (2.456) (6.323)
Income squared (10E-11) -6.760** -5.531* -5.443* -12.89
(2.989) (3.154) (3.156) (7.928)
Total wealth (10E-7) 12.94*** 9.211*** 9.271*** 24.37***
(2.035) (2.103) (2.103) (5.5814)
Total wealth squared (10E-13) -7.975** -4.960 -5.062 -14.21
(3.262) (3.335) (3.336) (8.979)
Self account management -0.00761 -0.00708 -.0279
(0.0237) (0.0237) (0.631)
Risk aversion (CARA) -0.160 -0.155 -0.3566
(0.146) (0.145) (0.365)
Liqudity constrained -0.133*** -0.134*** -0.345***
(0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0684)
Firm shares in remuneration 0.0844 0.0859* 0.194
(0.0521) (0.0520) (0.1311)
Temporal preference 0.0146*** 0.0145*** 0.0380***
(0.00526) (0.00525) (0.0146)
Online banking 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.260***
(0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0771)
Irregular income risk -0.0107 -0.00907 -0.0286
(0.0424) (0.0424) (0.1097)
Parents own stocks 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.384***
(0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0700)
Trust 0.0363 0.0390 0.0911
(0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0738)
Wald test of exogeneity: Chi-sq(1) 4.72
Pseudo R-squared/(P-value Chi-sq(1)) 0.0426 0.0472 0.0639 0.1191 0.1601 0.1582 (0.0298)
Chi-squared 118.1 131.0 177.3 320.0 429.9 424.9 389.4
Log-likelihood -1327 -1321 -1298 -1183 -1128 -1131 -11205
No of observations 2,066 2,066 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016
Note: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: TNS 2007.
22(corresponding to an increase of 12:5 percent in the unconditional probability). Given that we
condition on our measure of information, and that wealth does not increase the conditional odds
of being better informed, the identi￿ed positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects are consistent
with the presence of ￿xed/transaction costs of accessing the stock market.
Although previous empirical studies also ￿nd that education increases the probability of par-
ticipation, most of them interpret its e⁄ect as a proxy variable for information. The results in
Table 5, column (5) reveal that, conditioning on our individual measure of the most recent past
stock market performance, holding a college degree (or further) does not increase the probability
of participation at a statistically signi￿cant level, relative to those who hold only a high school
diploma or less. (Not even when we exclude it: column (6), Table 5).
Management variables also appear important: although those who take ￿nancial decisions by
themselves are less likely to participate relative to those who totally or partially delegate in a
￿nancial advisor, the e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant.48 On the other hand, those who manage
their accounts online (￿ online banking￿ ) are around 11 percent more likely to be stock owners, and if
respondents￿parents are stock owners themselves (￿ parents own stocks￿ ), they are 16 percent more
likely to own stocks themselves. Since Table 2 reports that neither signi￿cantly increases the odds
of being informed, we interpret these e⁄ects as inertial factors in stockownership.
Also, measures of preference heterogeneity are important and consistent with recent theoretical
contributions. Individuals who have a long planning horizon (temporal preference) are 1:4 pps.
more likely to participate than those who are impatient, in line with the empirical results obtained
by Donkers and van Soest (1999) for The Netherlands. More risk averse individuals also have a
lower probability of participation, although the e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant 49.50 Overall,
these e⁄ects are consistent with Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), who model optimal
information acquisition within the standard two-asset two-period portfolio choice model. They
￿nd that at the extensive margin, preference for an early resolution of uncertainty matters since
it determines the optimal amount of information, while risk aversion does not. Intuitively, within
an expected utility framework, risk aversion has a second order e⁄ect, a⁄ecting only the intensive
margin, and subjective stock market return expectations are formed conditional on respondents￿
individual information sets.
Constraints are very signi￿cant, in line with existing empirical results in the literature. House-
holds who have been liquidity constrained or who think that they will be so in the future are less
48In the next subsection, Table 8, we examine the conditional e⁄ect of conditional expectations on stockownership
for respondents who partially or totally delegate ￿nancial decition taking to a professional.
49Since we have found evidence consistent with the presence of ￿xed/transaction costs to access the stock market,
more risk averse respondents would ￿nd it less worth to pay them today. However, since within an expected utility
framework, they are also more prudent, they are more likely to save more, and invest part of the additional savings
in the stock market. Hence, the overall e⁄ect of risk aversion depends on the strength of the two opposing forces.
See Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) for additional details.
50The results are robust to an alternative measure of risk aversion: the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion for
preferences in the constant relative risk aversion class (CRRA), advanced by Barsky et al. (1997) and available in
the TNS 2007 survey wave. In addition, Kimball et al. (2008) show that the CRRA measure is robust to survey
measurement error. The results are available from the authors upon request.
23likely to participate (around 14 percent less likely). Deaton (1992) explains how the expectation
of being liquidity constrained in the future leads prudent households to save more (￿ bu⁄er stock￿ ),
which results in an overall reduction in stock ownership for those households whose preferences dis-
play both decreasing risk aversion (DARA) and prudence (DAP) ￿ Elmendorf and Kimball (2000).51
Although income risk has a negative e⁄ect on stock ownership, in line with theoretical predictions
(and simulations) that treat it as exogenous, the e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant.52
Finally, the age variables indicate that the probability of owning risky assets is lower for younger
households, although it has a hump-shaped e⁄ect reaching its maximum at the age of 50. In Tables
6 and 7 below, we decompose the e⁄ect of expectations on stock market participation by age groups.
4 Inspecting the Mechanism
In Table 6 we report the maginal e⁄ects of the estimation for respondents in the same age bracket
(50-80) as those exploited by Dominitz and Manski (2007) from the HRS 2004. Two main messages
emerge: (i) Dominitz and Manski￿ s (2007) results are robust to the inclusion of previously identi￿ed
covariates in the empirical literature of household ￿nance, like transaction costs (proxied by wealth),
liquidity constraints, income risk, access to the internet or preferences. (ii) Subjective stock market
return expectations of the elderly determine their ￿nancial investment decisions at the extensive
margin. However, information regarding past stock market performance does not because, as Figure
9 illustrates, they are overall (similarly) well informed.
In Table 7, we complete the life-cycle picture and report the estimated marginal e⁄ects of the
probit speci￿cation only for the young (18-49 age bracket). The main message conveyed is that
although subjective expectations determine the decision to enter the stock market by the young
unconditionally, once we condition on individual information sets, the e⁄ect of expectations becomes
statistically insigni￿cant.
To (i) further inquire into the conditional e⁄ect of subjective expectations on stockownership
decisions amongst the young, and (ii) because the precise mechanism whereby di⁄erences in (ability
to process, access to or in the actual stock of) ￿nancial information translate into di⁄erences in stock
market participation remains elusive (Lusardi et al., 2011; Grinblatt et al., 2011), we postulate a
two-step econometric speci￿cation whereby information (pi
t) a⁄ects the individual decision to hold
stocks only through its e⁄ect on subjective expectations (pi
t+1):
pi
t+1 = ￿tpi
t + ￿OOpti + ￿0xi + ut+1
Pr(si
t = 1
￿
￿pi
t+1;xi) = ￿(￿t+1pi
t+1 + ￿0xi)
)
(2)
51See also Gollier (2001), who proves that the willigness to take risk is reduced in the presence of a liquidity
constraint if absolute risk tolerance is increasing and convex in wealth.
52Tables 6 and 7 in the next subsection reveal that there is an age-composition e⁄ect of income risk on stock
ownership: it has a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect amongst the elderly (for whom it is either non-diversi￿able or non-
existent), while a positive non-signi￿cant one amongst the young (for whom it is endogenous while non-diversi￿able).
See Arrondel and Calvo-Pardo (2012) for a model that rationalizes this conclusion.
24Table 6: Probability of Holding Stocks or Stock Mutual Funds (50 ￿ Age ￿ 80)
2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Positive nominal return (PNR) 0.00194*** 0.00179*** 0.00179*** 0.00144*** 0.00134*** 0.00143*** 0.0055*
(0.00043) (0.000457) (0.000459) (0.000481) (0.000494) (0.000465) (0.0033)
Male 0.0195 0.0144 -8.16E-05 -0.0328 -0.0399 -0.0366 -0.0994
(0.0359) (0.0363) (0.0366) (0.0404) (0.0419) (0.0415) (0.1057)
Married/living with a partner 0.0542 0.0542 0.0685* -0.0117 -0.0110 -0.0113 -0.0445
(0.0392) (0.0393) (0.0396) (0.0441) (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.1153)
Age 0.0763** 0.0758** 0.0840** 0.0647* 0.0719* 0.0719* 0.1851*
(0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0356) (0.037) (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0949)
Age squared -0.000567** -0.000564** -0.000620** -0.000472 -0.000528* -0.000528* -0.00136*
(0.000279) (0.000279) (0.000282) (0.000292) (0.000300) (0.000300) (0.00074)
Past positive nominal return (pPNR) 0.0005 0.000507 0.000304 0.000309
(0.000503) (0.000505) (0.000529) (0.000547)
Education
(Ref. category: High school or less)
Less than college 0.135*** 0.0799 0.0741 0.0743 0.1964
(0.0486) (0.0513) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.1390)
College or more 0.204*** 0.0568 0.0362 0.0356 0.0993
(0.0548) (0.0645) (0.0678) (0.0678) (0.1705)
Income (10E-6) 8.739** 5.440 5.418 12.551
(3.905) (4.156) (4.152) (9.485)
Income squared (10E-11) -8.942* -6.387 -6.305 -14.790
(5.426) (5.688) (5.674) (11.25)
Total wealth (10E-7) 14.62*** 12.38*** 12.37*** 31.19***
(3.37) (3.491) (3.491) (8.742)
Total wealth squared (10E-13) -10.73** -9.604* -9.597* -24.49*
(5.048) (5.200) (5.200) (13.24)
Self account management -0.0579 -0.0580 -0.1549
(0.0388) (0.0388) (0.1006)
Risk aversion (CARA) -0.0327 -0.0339 -0.0681
(0.209) (0.209) (0.503))
Liquidity constrained -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.371***
(0.0415) (0.0415) (0.1090)
Firm shares in remuneration -0.0209 -0.0193 -0.0450
(0.0990) (0.0989) (0.239)
Temporal preference 0.0158* 0.0161* 0.0409*
(0.00909) (0.00907) (0.0235)
Online banking 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.436***
(0.0538) (0.0537) (0.1404)
Irregular income risk -0.153* -0.153* -0.401*
(0.0838) (0.0838) (0.2263)
Parents own stocks 0.182*** 0.180*** 0.444***
(0.0445) (0.0445) (0.1142)
Trust 0.0102 0.0128 0.0242
(0.0431) (0.0428) (0.1123)
Wald test of exogeneity: Chi-sq(1) 0.37
Pseudo R-squared (P-value Chi-sq(1)) 0.0298 0.0306 0.042 0.0989 0.1438 0.1435 (0.542)
Chi-squared 34.89 35.88 49.23 110.9 161.2 160.9 137.16
Log-likelihood -568.6 -568.1 -561.4 -505.1 -480.0 -480.1 -4579.2
No of Observations 847 847 813 813 813 813 813
Note: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: TNS 2007.
25Table 7: Probability of Holding Stocks or Stock Mutual Funds (Age< 50)
2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Positive nominal return (PNR) 0.00177*** 0.00118*** 0.00106*** 0.000750* 0.000482 0.000890** 0.00956***
(0.000365) (0.000392) (0.000393) (0.000403) (0.000408) (0.000382) (0.00270)
Male 0.0124 0.000113 0.0115 0.000977 -0.00559 0.00338 -0.0226
(0.0277) (0.0279) (0.0281) (0.0302) (0.0308) (0.0306) (0.0877)
Married/living with a partner 0.0322 0.0370 0.0491 -0.0379 -0.0322 -0.0352 -0.0497
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.0348) (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0998)
Age 0.0453*** 0.0436*** 0.0335** 2.45E-02 0.0292* 0.0296* 0.0790*
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.015) (0.0158) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0461)
Age squared -0.000584*** -0.000573*** -0.000420** -0.000371* -0.000388* -0.000386* -0.00107*
(0.000206) (0.000207) (0.000212) (0.000223) (0.000230) (0.000229) (0.00064)
Past positive nominal return (pPNR) 0.00165*** 0.00143*** 0.00122*** 0.00119***
(0.000411) (0.000414) (0.000423) (0.000428)
Education
(Ref. category: High school or less)
Less than college 0.168* 0.0892 0.0421 0.0439 0.132
(0.0874) (0.0909) (0.0932) (0.0928) (0.2943)
College or more 0.346*** 0.197* 0.107 0.115 0.295
(0.0988) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.303)
Income (10E-6) 5.721* 4.430 4.521 11.54
(3.052) (3.225) (3.224) (9.143)
Income squared (10E-11) -5.042 -5.043 -4.892 -13.36
(3.973) (4.117) (4.116) (11.80)
Total wealth (10E-7) 11.16*** 6.765** 6.987*** 18.88**
(2.556) (2.644) (2.645) (7.533)
Total wealth squared (10E-13) -4.845 -1.088 -1.376 -5.229
(4.472) (4.575) (4.589) (12.87)
Self account management 0.0280 0.0298 0.0800
(0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0823)
Risk aversion (CARA) -0.234 -0.201 -0.530
(0.214) (0.212) (0.581)
Liquidity constrained -0.133*** -0.134*** -0.352***
(0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0910)
Firm shares in remuneration 0.116* 0.116* 0.243
(0.0611) (0.0610) (0.1588)
Temporal preference 0.0147** 0.0137** 0.038**
(0.00643) (0.00640) (0.0193)
Online banking 0.0563* 0.0595* 0.1436
(0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0948)
Irregular income risk 0.0407 0.0428 0.1134
(0.0482) (0.0482) (0.1256)
Parents own stocks 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.3417***
(0.0319) (0.0318) (0.0904)
Trust 0.0557 0.0547 0.1498
(0.0350) (0.0350) (0.1025)
Wald test of exogeneity: Chi-sq (1) 6.93
Pseudo R-squared/(P-value Chi-sq (1)) 0.0315 0.0422 0.657 0.1247 0.1710 0.1658 (0.0085)
Chi-squared 47.65 63.78 99.36 185.4 254.2 246.5 241.21
Log-likelihood -732.4 -724.3 -706.5 -650.8 -616.4 -620.3 -6439.61
No of Observations 1,188 1,188 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174
Note: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: TNS 2007.
26where Opti denotes the ￿ optimism￿of the respondent, treated as a ￿xed personality trait ￿ see Table
4. (ut+1;et) are assumed to follow a zero mean, bivariate normal distribution, independent of
(xi;Opti).
The two-step econometric speci￿cation (2) is more e¢ ciently estimated jointly by maximum
likelihood. It e⁄ectively assumes that "agents solve the investment decision problem in two stages:
derivation of the vector of conditional expected returns, and choice of an optimal portfolio of as-
sets using estimated expected returns" (Separation Theorem in Gennotte, 1986).53 The advantage
of the two-step estimation strategy is that it allows us to consider individual information as an
instrumental variable for subjective expectations and test its statistical validity, in the sense that
the exclusion restriction requires that information has no direct e⁄ect on stockownership other
than through expectations. Table 7, column (7) reports statistical evidence in support of a causal
e⁄ect of subjective expectations: they have a stastitically signi￿cant and quantitatively important
positive e⁄ect on stockownership decisions amongst the young. The Chi-square statistic of 6:93
reported at the bottom, has an associated P-value of 0:0085, con￿rming that there is statistical
evidence in support of the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
Similarly, below column (7) in Tables 5 and 6, we report the maximum likelihood coe¢ cient
estimates of speci￿cation (2) for all ages and the elderly, respectively. For all, the reported quan-
titative e⁄ect corresponds to a 115:1 percent increase in the probability of holding stocks, when
comparing the conditional probability of detention amongst those who are certain that the stock
market will not increase (23.9%) with the probability of those who are sure that it will increase
over the next 5 years (51,4%). The Chi-square statistic of 4:72 reported at the bottom of Table 5
column (7), has an associated P-value of 0:0298, con￿rming that there is weaker statistical evidence
in support of the null hypothesis of exogeneity for all ages than there is amongst the young. The
Amemiya-Lee-Newey Chi-squared statistic for overidentifying restrictions with 1 degree of freedom
(when optimism is interpreted as a valid additional instrument; KØzdi and Willis, 2008) reports a
value of 1:014; with an associated P-value of 0:3140; con￿rming the validity of information as an
instrument, conditional on optmism being also a valid instrument. However, and in contrast to the
young, we are unable to reject the null of exogeneity of subjective expectations on the stockowner-
ship decisions amongst the elderly, and hence the results under speci￿cation (1) remain valid (and
causal) for them.
To further inquire into the causal e⁄ect of conditional sujective expectations on stockownership,
we conduct a counter-factual test, reported in Table 8 by age groups. The results show that
respondents￿conditional expectations who have totally or partially delegated ￿nancial decision
taking to a professional (i.e. those who have signed a ￿ mandat de gestion￿ ), do not (consistenly)
determine their stockownership decisions. In unreported regressions, we further inquired into the
robustness of our ￿ndings to unobserved state dependence, measured by the number of stock market
53The crucial assumption for the separation between the estimation of future stock market returns and the selection
of the optimal portfolio to hold is that the distribution of realized returns does not depend on the level of investment.
Otherwise, the quality of information depends on how much was invested in the past, and hence on past return
realizations. See Genotte (1986), pp. 742-3, for further details.
27Table 8: Probability of Holding Stocks or Stock Mutual Funds: 2SLS by Age and Financial Advisor
All Ages 50 ￿ Age ￿ 80 Age < 50
Positive nominal return (PNR) 0.007 0.0094 0.00782
(0.0499) (0.0102) (0.00562)
Male -0.211 -0.2997 -0.107
(0.132) (0.2051) (0.188)
Married/living with a partner 0.0451 0.0525 -0.0546
(0.127) (0.2104) (0.181)
Age 0.0373 0.4569** 0.201*
(0.0248) (0.1856) (0.115)
Age squared -0.00016 -0.0035** -0.00247
(0.00024) (0.0015) (0.00156)
Past positive nominal return (pPNR) - - -
Education
(Ref. category: High school or less)
Less than college 0.120 0.0197 0.576
(0.228) (0.3356) (0.477)
College or more 0.252 0.2545 0.629
(0.246) (0.3636) (0.495)
Income (10E-6) 23.45* -35.15 11.93
(13.44) (25.16) (21.85)
Income squared (10E-11) -32.10* -35.147 -22.47
(18.02) (25.16) (28.38)
Total wealth (10E-7) 18.26* 38.94** 2.777
(10.143) ((15.238)) (15.54)
Total wealth squared (10E-13) -9.40 -40.85* 23.08
(15.36) (22.934) (25.97)
Self account management - - -
Risk aversion (CARA) -1.318 -2.219* -0.514
(0.952) (1.286) (1.999)
Liquidity constrained -0.293** -0.3688 -0.296*
(0.1304) (0.2353)) (0.170)
Firm shares in remuneration 0.325 0.203 0.388
(0.280) (0.6354) (0.300)
Temporal preference 0.0566** -0.0021 0.101**
(0.0284) (0.047)) (0.0396)
Online banking -0.0935 -0.2615 -0.0353
(0.154) (0.2978) (0.188)
Irregular income risk -0.349 -1.164*** -0.0359
(0.218) (0.3973) (0.266)
Parents own stocks 0.537*** 0.3709* 0.583***
(0.133) (0.2114) (0.175)
Trust -0.0048 0.0495 -0.148
(0.142) (0.2122) (0.211)
Wald test of exogeneity: Chi-sq (1) 0.11 0.01 1.14
P-value Chi-sq (1) 0.7430 0.9120 0.2866
Chi-squared 117.39 60.0 55.44
Log-likelihood -3156 -1461.67 -1589.11
No of Observations 570 265 290
Note: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: TNS 2007.
28operations carried over the previous year. Amongst respondents that have not recently traded in
the stockmarket (inertial non-/stockholders), we ￿nd that their conditional expectations do not
(consistently) determine their stock ownership decisions.54
Figure 11 reports kernel-smoothed estimates of the mean reported realized nominal return
conditional on age and stockownership status: stockholders appear better informed than non-
stockholders between the late 20s and the early 50s, being statistically indistinguishable at earlier
and later stages. The displayed patterns are not completely consistent with "learning from ex-
perience" (Linnainmaa, 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2013), whereby young stockholders
should be much better informed about the most recent stockmarket return realization than old
stockholders, while the opposite holds in Figure 11. As well, they are di¢ cult to reconcile with
a pure life-cycle "￿nancial literacy" argument (Lusardi et al., 2012), since even non-stockholders
seem to accumulate relevant ￿nancial information over their life-cycles (although they start at a
later stage than stockholders).
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Figure 11: Information (mean realized return) by age, for stockholders (black) and non-stockholders (grey).
Source: TNS 2007.
These results, together with Figure 9, lend support to King and Leape (1987) and Hurd￿ s
(2009) conjectures: what determines stock market participation amongst the young is their degree
of awareness regarding the investment opportunities the stock market o⁄ers, and we add ￿ through
their impact on subjective stock market return expectations￿ .55
Table 9 reports estimated marginal e⁄ects for the same speci￿cation as in Table 5, but on a
narrower de￿nition of stockholdings (direct stockholders only), by age groups (18-49, 50-80 and all
54The results are available from the authors upon request.
55In the not for publication appendix A, we extract the information component of expectations using a simple
linear regression. The predicted OLS residual is the conditional probability of a positive nominal return over the
next ￿ve years. It is plotted in Figure 1 in the not for publication appendix A, which broadly displays a hump-
shaped pattern by age. In unreported estimations, we replaced PNR and pPNR in the main probit speci￿cation by
the conditional probability thus computed. It has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on stockholdings amongst the young,
consistent with the expectations of the informed being instrumental for the decision to own stocks and against a
persistence interpretation. These results are available upon request.
29ages). Since mutual funds are professionally managed, narrowing the de￿nition to exclude them
should lead to respondents￿decisions being more responsive to their expectations. For each age
group, we examine the within e⁄ect that conditioning on information (even numbered columns)
has on the unconditional e⁄ect (odd numbered columns) of expected stock market performance on
the decision to invest in shares of national and foreign ￿rms. For all age groups, the main mes-
sage remains although quantitatively the estimated coe¢ cients are roughly similar. Importantly,
comparison of the last two columns of the table lends support to Dominitz and Manski￿ s (2011) con-
jecture about the importance of heterogeneity in the amount of public information when accounting
for heterogeneity in subjective expectations: the upwards bias in the unconditional marginal e⁄ect
of expectations on decisions (all ages, column (5)) due to the e⁄ect of information on expectations
(all ages, column (5)) is larger with a narrower de￿nition of stock ownership.56
Finally, Table 10 reports the estimated marginal e⁄ects by respondents￿(top) quartile of total
wealth (under columns (3) and (4)), and by respondents￿information (last two columns). For
each subgroup, we examine the e⁄ect of conditioning on information (even numbered columns) on
the unconditional e⁄ect (odd-numbered columns) of expectations on the decision to own stocks
(directly and indirectly). Amongst those who are in the top quartile of the total wealth distrib-
ution (stock of total wealth above e236,000), the conditional marginal e⁄ect of expectations on
stockownership roughly doubles in size relative to those in the lower quartiles. Hence, the e⁄ect of
conditional subjective expectations is strenghtened amongst the rich, contrary to the e⁄ect of par-
ticipation/transaction costs. Also, and although our measure of trust is not comparable to Guiso
et al. (2008), its positive e⁄ect on stockownership becomes statistically insigni￿cant for the wealth-
ier. Therefore, when accounting for non-participation amongst the most a› uent, heterogeneity
in conditional return expectations appears as a di⁄erent alternative to better private investment
opportunities (Heaton and Lucas, 2000) or taxation (Poterba, 2002), while encompassing the abil-
ity to process it (Grinblatt et al., 2011), its sources (social interactions, Hong et al., 2004; trust,
Guiso et al., 2008) or more broadly, ￿nancial literacy (van Rooij et al., 2011) through our novel
information measure.
Comparing columns (5) and (6) of Table 10, notice that even amongst the uninformed, the e⁄ect
of expectations on stock market participation is quantitatively very important and statistically very
signi￿cant (column 2, pPNR < 100), in line with elementary portfolio choice predictions (Arrow,
1965; Merton, 1969) and with extensions to incorporate incomplete information (Merton, 1987;
O￿ Hara, 2003; Biais et al., 2010). Compared to the informed (column 1, pPNR = 100), expectations
matter even more.57 We rationalize this last ￿nding as follows: if information a⁄ects decisions
56Qualitatively similar conclusions follow when we examine the conditional e⁄ect of expectations on decisions by
￿nancial decision taker: conditioning on information, the e⁄ect of expectations on decisions is quantitatively more
important for those who delegate than for those who do not. In addition, and consistent with Table 4 results, we ￿nd
that (i) amongst those who do not delegate ￿nancial decisions partially or totally, males are about 9% more likely to
be stock owners than females, and about 11% less likely amongst those who delegate. Similarly, (ii) having access to
online banking increases the probability of owning stocks by 12% amongst those who do not delegate, while it has no
e⁄ect amongst those who delegate. These results are unreported to save on space, but are available upon request.
57This e⁄ect appears very robust to relaxing the de￿nition of "informed". For example, when classifying respondents
as informed if "pPNR>50" (those who gave more than a 50-50 percent chance of the stock market index going up
30Table 9: Probability of Holding Stocks (Only)
Age< 50 50 ￿ Age ￿ 80 All ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive nominal return (PNR) 0.000658** 0.000305 0.000962*** 0.000656 0.000829*** 0.000525**
(0.000261) (0.000307) (0.000347) (0.000415) (0.000208) (0.000246)
Male -0.001852 -0.00843 0.00722 0.000795 0.00146 -0.00338
(0.0208) (0.0230) (0.0309) (0.0355) (0.0173) (0.0194)
Married/living with a partner -0.0109 -0.0147 -0.0136 -0.00595 -0.0131 -0.0116
(0.0244) (0.0269) (0.0342) (0.0388) (0.0196) (0.0217)
Age -0.00802 -0.00479 0.0177 0.00344 0.000878 -0.000246
(0.0110) (0.0122) (0.0286) (0.0319) (0.00337) (0.00374)
Age squared 0.000116 6.08e-05 -0.000131 -1.81e-05 1.27e-05 2.42e-05
(0.000155) (0.000171) (0.000225) (0.000252) (3.32e-05) (3.67e-05)
Past positive nominal return (pPNR) 0.00105*** 0.000507 0.000799***
(0.000328) (0.000461) (0.000268)
Education
(Ref. category: High school or less)
Less than college 0.150* 0.146* 0.0368 0.0408 0.0313 0.0349
(0.0780) (0.0880) (0.0408) (0.0468) (0.0305) (0.0346)
College or more 0.221 0.200 0.0393 0.0447 0.0445 0.0453
(0.135) (0.139) (0.0539) (0.0609) (0.0375) (0.0418)
Income (10E-6) 3.546* 2.988 5.891* 6.107* 4.062** 3.932**
(2.096) (2.352) (3.287) (3.596) (1.658) (1.861)
Income squared (10E-11) -1.077 -1.454 -6.512 -6.691 -2.674 -3.125
(2.553) (2.910) (4.540) (4.834) (2.010) (2.282)
Total wealth (10E-7) 8.305*** 7.349*** 9.623*** 10.69*** 8.517*** 8.393***
(1.713) (1.891) (2.572) (2.961) (1.443) (1.616)
Total wealth squared (10E-13) -9.175*** -6.987** -8.716** -10.06** -8.128*** -7.541***
(2.739) (3.028) (3.788) (4.280) (2.196) (2.430)
Self account management 0.0139 0.00338 0.0373 0.0329 0.0223 0.0159
(0.0202) (0.0221) (0.0294) (0.0330) (0.0169) (0.0187)
Risk aversion (CARA) -0.0153 -0.207 0.0759 0.0527 0.0319 -0.0535
(0.134) (0.157) (0.154) (0.184) (0.0982) (0.115)
Liquidity constrained -0.0600*** -0.0582** -0.0954*** -0.111*** -0.0784*** -0.0817***
(0.0211) (0.0230) (0.0304) (0.0344) (0.0174) (0.0194)
Firm shares in remuneration 0.0341 0.0398 -0.0111 -0.0196 0.0285 0.0339
(0.0405) (0.0452) (0.0744) (0.0798) (0.0375) (0.0416)
Temporal preference 0.00165 0.00257 0.0107 0.0116 0.00552 0.00585
(0.00438) (0.00486) (0.00692) (0.00812) (0.00378) (0.00428)
Online banking 0.0908*** 0.0919*** 0.238*** 0.254*** 0.142*** 0.147***
(0.0243) (0.0262) (0.0462) (0.0497) (0.0230) (0.0249)
Irregular income risk 0.0234 0.0119 -0.00830 -0.00461 0.0226 0.0179
(0.0343) (0.0366) (0.0693) (0.0792) (0.0327) (0.0360)
Parents own stocks 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.132*** 0.140*** 0.115*** 0.123***
(0.0232) (0.0250) (0.0371) (0.0407) (0.0203) (0.0221)
Pseudo R-squared 0.1765 0.1742 0.1649 0.1671 0.1705 0.1698
Chi-squared 230.3 200.3 180.7 159.9 418.3 366.9
Log-likelihood -537.2 -474.9 -457.6 -398.6 -1017 -896.8
No of Observations 1,355 1,174 962 813 2,349 2,016
Note: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: TNS 2007.
31Table 10: Probability of Holding Stocks or Stock Mutual Funds by Wealth and Information
Wealth<75th percentile Wealth￿75th percentile pPNR=100 pPNR< 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive nominal return (PNR) 0.000937*** 0.000663* 0.00131** 0.00115** 0.000613 0.00115***
(0.000316) (0.000342) (0.000532) (0.000557) (0.000429) (0.000431)
Male -0.000865 -0.00746 -0.0437 -0.0498 0.0288 -0.0699**
(0.0261) (0.0263) (0.0452) (0.0456) (0.0391) (0.0305)
Married/living with a partner -0.0419 -0.0393 0.0708 0.0673 -0.0958** 0.0369
(0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0434) (0.0330)
Age -0.000549 -0.00125 0.000374 0.000566 -0.00585 0.00285
(0.00481) (0.00482) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.00755) (0.00592)
Age squared 4.79e-05 3.82e-05 3.57e-05 -4.95e-07 8.14e-05 2.72e-05
(4.82e-05) (4.82e-05) (0.000101) (0.000101) (7.35e-05) (5.94e-05)
Past positive nominal return (pPNR) 0.000745** 0.000593
(0.000364) (0.000604)
Education
(Ref. category: High school or less)
Less than college 0.0255 0.0231 0.0556 0.0600 0.0111 0.0412
(0.0431) (0.0432) (0.0837) (0.0836) (0.0665) (0.0530)
College or more 0.0477 0.0451 0.117 0.118 -0.00455 0.115*
(0.0528) (0.0528) (0.0878) (0.0876) (0.0748) (0.0657)
Income (10E-6) 2.814 2.530 5.075 5.254 5.934* 6.328
(3.037) (3.053) (4.210) (4.233) (3.548) (4.359)
Income squared (10E-11) 0.0822 0.405 -7.567 -7.895 -5.938 -10.38
(4.601) (4.647) (5.128) (5.174) (4.074) (7.697)
Total wealth (10E-7) 24.22*** 24.30*** 20.92** 20.42** 11.24*** 7.831***
(6.584) (6.584) (10.17) (10.18) (3.313) (2.623)
Total wealth squared (10E-13) -87.57*** -87.83*** -17.05 -16.48 -5.845 -4.784
(29.13) (29.11) (11.00) (11.01) (5.305) (4.138)
Risk aversion (CARA) -0.0333 -0.0357 -0.375 -0.373 -0.431* -0.0244
(0.151) (0.152) (0.299) (0.299) (0.238) (0.181)
Liquidity constrained -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.0448 -0.0428 -0.140*** -0.125***
((0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0498) (0.0499) (0.0396) (0.0299)
Firm shares in remuneration 0.0776 0.0764 0.0811 0.0785 0.0727 0.0727
(0.0570) (0.0570) (0.0882) (0.0888) (0.0736) (0.0723)
Temporal preference 0.0104* 0.0104* 0.0194* 0.0192* 0.0230*** 0.00922
(0.00533) (0.00533) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.00836) (0.00651)
Online banking 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.0847* 0.0824* 0.0996** 0.0923**
(0.0345) (0.0345) (0.0475) (0.0477) (0.0438) (0.0396)
Irregular income risk -0.0276 -0.0307 0.0104 0.0116 -0.00311 -0.00983
(0.0437) (0.0435) (0.0789) (0.0790) (0.0699) (0.0514)
Parents own stocks 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.182*** 0.140***
(0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0422) (0.0423) (0.0396) (0.0348)
Self account management -0.0174 -0.0173 0.0111 0.00953 0.0202 -0.0312
(0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0374) (0.0294)
Trust 0.0527* 0.0495* 0.00830 0.00669 0.0223 0.0492
(0.0291) (0.0292) (0.0511) (0.0512) (0.0433) (0.0346)
Pseudo R-squared 0.1130 0.0889 0.0926 0.0938 0.1500 0.1602
Chi-squared 199.8 204.0 76.42 77.38 184.8 224.6
Log-likelihood -742.9 -740.8 -374.4 -373.9 -523.6 -588.7
No of Observations 1,402 1,402 614 614 891 1,124
Note: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: TNS 2007.
32only through expectations, in accordance with speci￿cation (2), within the most homogeneous
information group one would expect expectations to di⁄er less, and hence to be less important
empirically in accounting for di⁄erences in investment decisions. In the limit, perfectly informed
individuals would all form rational expectations, and cross-sectional di⁄erences in decisions could
not be explained by di⁄erences in expectations, as implicitly assumed in the literature until recently.
Dominitz and Manski (2011) report evidence consistent with persistence in the modal type of
revision of expectations with new public information. Hence, if the informed process information
similarly, they will revise their expectations similarly, and there will be less cross-sectional variation
in their expectations than there will be amongst the uninformed.
5 Conclusion
Elementary static (Arrow, 1965) and dynamic (Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969) models of port-
folio choice put emphasis on the importance of individuals￿expectations to explain stock market
participation. However, it has been pervasive in the empirical literature on household portfolios
to adopt the rational expectations assumption, thus neglecting a potential source of heterogeneity
that, in addition to heterogeneity in preferences, endowments and constraints, could help reconcile
economic theory predictions with empirically observed low participation rates.
In line with some recent e⁄orts in the literature (Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Hurd et al.,
2011; KØzdi and Willis, 2009; Miniaci and Pastorello, 2010), here we have collected novel data
on households￿expectations and, for the ￿rst time, on households￿information sets (TNS 2007).
To validate our novel data set, and for comparison purposes, we have adopted Dominitz and
Manski￿ s (2007) methodology. Our results con￿rm that the novel e⁄ect of expectations on the
decision to participate in the stock market ￿rst identi￿ed by them amongst the elderly, is robust
to the inclusion of measures of information, risk and time preference, endowments and constraints.
Crucially, it extends to a representative sample by age and wealth. Most of the included factors
had been previously identi￿ed in the literature as important determinants of age-portfolio pro￿les
at the extensive margin. Similar conclusions ground the works by Hurd et al. (2011), KØzdi and
Willis (2009) or Miniaci and Pastorello (2010) on either selected samples or with a di⁄erent set of
covariates.
But, taking advantage of our novel information measure, we are able to empirically (i) con￿rm
King and Leape (1987) - Hurd￿ s (2009) conjecture for the ￿rst time, on the importance of being
aware of the investment opportunities o⁄ered by the stock market (the ￿ investor recognition hy-
pothesis￿of Merton, 1987), specially to account for low participation rates of the young; (ii) con￿rm
the basic principle of elementary portfolio choice models, since even amongst the uninformed and
the a› uent, subjective stock market expectations determine their decision to participate (Arrow,
1965; Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969), and when individually elicited information is exploited as
an instrumental variable, we identify a causal e⁄ect of expectations on stock market participation
over the last 5 years), and uninformed otherwise, the marginal e⁄ect of expectations on decisions for the informed
was 0:0021; whereas for the uninformed was 0:0057:
33conditional on wealth, income, and measures of attitudes, preferences and socio-economic and de-
mographic characteristics; (iii) con￿rm the e⁄ect of social interactions, professional advice, past
own experience and specialised media access, as relevant sources of information at the individual
level, thereby contributing to the literature on ￿nancial literacy, trust and adaptive expectations.
However, (iv) although males appear better informed and are also more likely to take ￿nancial
decisions by themselves instead of delegating; and conditioning on gender, optimists appear less
well informed, at odds with a behavioural overcon￿dence bias interpretation (Guiso and Jappelli,
2006), but in line with inertia amongst the general population (Bilias et al., 2010). Finally, (v) poor
or constrained households, for whom stock market information is useless, appear less well informed
in line with rational inattention theory (Sims, 2003).
Our results suggest novel and important policy implications, that deepen and complement
those already identi￿ed: (i) in the ￿nancial literacy literature (e.g. Christelis et al., 2010; van
Rooij et al., 2011), i.e. absence of ￿nancial speci￿c knowledge is pervasive amongst the young,
irrespective of their level of educational attainement, with potentially dramatic consequences for
wealth accumulation over the life-cycle and hence, for wealth inequality (Lusardi et al., 2012);
(ii) in macroeconomics, i.e. publicly available information appears costly to acquire in terms of
money, e⁄ort or time, explaining information stickiness and hence stickiness in expectations (e.g.
Carroll, 2003); (iii) in ￿nance, i.e. recent contributions examining the asset pricing consequences
of heterogeneous return expectations, since expectational heterogeneity apears to be fuelled by
heterogeneity in public information gathering/processing (e.g. Allen, Morris and Shin, 2006).
However, many questions remain that would require further data collection and analysis.58
Perhaps the most important one is that much observed heterogeneity remains unexplained at the
extensive margin. In light of our results and the recent crisis, attempts to understand Dominitz
and Manski￿ s (2011) conjecture about heterogeneity in processing public information feeding hetero-
geneity in subjective expectations, is likely to be the most promising and challenging one (Frydman
and Phelps, 2013). In that respect, we welcome the recent launch of the Survey of Consumer Ex-
pectations by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York59, and hope that the results reported convey
the complementary usefulness of including also retrospective probabilistic assessments of public
information events.
58Data collection is crucial if one aims at understanding the macroeconomic implications and derive policy rec-
comendations using realistically calibrated dynamic macroeconomic models (ex. Alan, 2010).
59For further information, see http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/12/introducing-the-frbny-
survey-of-consumer-expectations-survey-goals-design-and-content.html
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40Appendix
A. Variable De￿nitions
Endowments
Total wealth: In the survey, the respondent is asked in which of the eight prede￿ned available brackets is her household￿ s situation. As we
are interested in a continuous measure, we have used the method of simulated residuals (Gourieroux et al. 1987). We have regressed an
ordered probit of the respondents￿ total wealth (bracket) on demographic and socio-economic household characteristics. Once we have
the estimated total wealth, a normally distributed error is added. We then check if the value falls inside the bracket originally chosen by
the individual. If not, another normal error is added and so on until we predict the true interval. Doing so allows us to overcome the
non-response problem for some households. If there is a missing value, the predicted value plus a normal error is directly used. Total
wealth is given in Euros.
Income: For the income of the household, the survey asks the respondent which of the 7 prede￿ned available brackets better corresponds to her
situation. We obtained a continuous measure in the same way we did for total wealth. Income refers to the individual￿ s household annual
income in Euros.
Preferences
Absolute risk aversion (CARA): The following question is asked to the respondent: ￿ If someone suggests that you make an investment, e Si,
whereby you have one chance out of two win 5000 euros and one chance out of two of losing the capital invested, how much (as a
maximum) will you invest?￿ The question aims at eliciting the taste for risk from each respondent i; with preferences ui(:), from the
following equality:
ui(wi) =
1
2
ui(wi+5;000)+
1
2
ui(wi￿Zi) ￿ Eu
i(wi+e Si)
The coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion (CARA) can be then obtained from a second order Taylor expansion, as
Ai(wi) = 2(5000 ￿ Zi)=(5000
2+Z2
i)
where Zi is the amount that the respondent declares to be willing to invest. Those who declare Zi< 5000 are risk-averse Zi= 5000,
are risk-neutral and Zi> 5000 are risk-lovers. The outcome range for the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion Ai(wi) is [0;40]:
3,343 respondents answered the question, with a mean response of 39.11. In the TNS 2007, the histogram of responses is very skewed to
the left. Further details regarding the measure of absolute risk aversion (CARA) can be found in Guiso and Paiella￿ s (2008) work.
Relative risk aversion (CRRA): To obtain a measure of risk aversion, we asked individuals about their willingness to gamble on lifetime income
according to the methodology of Barsky et al. (1997). The ￿game￿ resides in determining sequentially whether the interviewee would
accept to give up his present income and to accept other contracts, in the form of lotteries: he has one chance in two to double his income,
and one chance in two for it to be reduced by one third (contract A), by one half (contract B), and by one ￿fth (contract C). More
precisely, the question in the survey was:
* ￿ Suppose that you have a job which guarantees for life your household￿ s current income R. Other companies o⁄er you various contracts
which have one chance out of two (50%) to provide you with a higher income and one chance out of two (50%) to provide you with a lower
income.
41* Are you prepared to accept Contract A which has 50% chances to double your income R and 50% chances that your income will be reduced
by one third?
* For those who answer YES : the Contract A is no longer available. You are o⁄ered Contract B instead which has 50% chances to double
your income R and 50% chances that it will be reduced by one half. Are you prepared to accept?
* For those who answer NO : you have refused Contract A. You are o⁄ered Contract C. which has 50% chances to double your income R
and 50% chances that it will be reduced by 20%. Are you prepared to accept?￿
This allows us to obtain a range measure of relative risk aversion under the assumption that preferences are strictly risk averse and utility is
of the CRRA type. The degree of relative risk aversion is less than 1 if the individual successively accepts contracts A and B; between 1 and 2 if
he accepts A but refuses B; between 2 and 3.76 if he refuses A but accepts C; and ￿nally more than 3.76 if he refuses both A and C.
Temporal preference: It is a numerical scale from 0 to 10. The survey asks the respondent about her attitude regarding life: 0 represents living
the present (impatience) and 10 only caring about the future (extreme patience).
Demographics
Gender: is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is a male, and is equal to 0, if a female.
Marital status: Marital status is based on current legal marital status. Respondents who are married or/and living with a partner are coded as
1, and 0 otherwise.
Constraints
Liquidity constrained: Respondents are asked if they ever had to struggle to balance their household budget. It is a dummy variable that takes
value 1 if the respondent answers the question in the categories ￿ very often￿ or ￿ often￿ , and value 0 otherwise.
Online banking: It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent uses the internet for managing her ￿nancial accounts, and 0 otherwise.
Importance of Money in Life: Respondents are asked about the relative importance of money in life. It is a quantitative variable on a discrete
scale from 0 to 10.
Income Risk: Question qa16 in the survey asks respondents about the regularity of household￿ s income (wages, retirement income...), providing
three categories: ￿ regular, certain￿ ; ￿ irregular, random￿ and ￿ partly certain, partly random￿ . Income risk is de￿ned as a dummy variable
that takes value 1 if the respondent answers ￿ irregular, random￿ , and zero otherwise.
Delegation/Inertia/Trust
Self portfolio management: The survey asks the respondent who takes household￿ s ￿nancial decisions (stocks, SICAV/FCP bonds, life insurance
contracts, saving accounts). Respondents who answer ￿ themselves￿ or ￿ them with their partners￿ are coded as 1, and 0 otherwise (which
includes sharing some decisions with a ￿nancial advisor, or the ￿nancial advisor taking all decisions on the households￿ behalf).
Firm shares in remuneration: It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent receives shares of the ￿rm he works in as part of her
compensation package/remuneration, and 0 otherwise.
42Frequency of recent trades: Respondents are asked about the number of stock market operations closed over the year prior to the date in which
the survey was conducted (March 2006-March 2007). The answers are categorical: no operations, 1-2 operations, 3-5 operations, 6 or more
operations.
Optimism: Respondents are inquired ￿ whether they esteem that they have been lucky in life￿ . It is a discrete variable, that takes value 1 if they
answer ￿ yes￿ , and 0 otherwise.
Trust: Respondents are inquired ￿ whether they trust online payment systems￿ . It is a discrete variable that takes value 1 if they answer either
￿ yes￿ or ￿ rather yes￿ , and 0 if they either answer ￿ rather no￿ or ￿ absolutely not￿ .
Parents own stocks: Respondents are inquired ￿ whether their parents invest/ed in the stock market either directly or indirectly￿ . It is a discrete
variable that takes value 1 if they answer either ￿ yes￿ , and 0 if they either answer ￿ no￿ .
Information
Education: is a categorical variable, grouped into three broad categories: High school or less (primary and secondary), some college (technical
degrees beyond high school but below college, including professional and vocational degrees) and college or more (BAs, BScs, MScs, MBAs,
professional certi￿cations, PhDs and postdoctoral students).
Sources of Information variables:
* Respondents are inquired, for each alternative source of information (Friends, family, ￿nancial advisors, general media and specialised
media), about the relative frequency of consultation (often, sometimes or never). For each information source, a dummy variable is created
which takes value 1 if the answer is ￿ often￿ , and 0 otherwise.
* Respondents are inquired, for each alternative source of TV information (General information and economics emissions) , about the relative
frequency of consultation (very often, often, occasionally, sometimes or never). For each information source, a dummy variable is created
which takes value 1 if the answer is ￿ often￿ or ￿ very often￿ , and 0 otherwise.
Mother￿ s education: The respondent is inquired about the educational attainment of her mother. Three categories are available: less than High
school, completed High school and more than High school. The reference category is ￿ less than High school￿ .
Father￿ s education: The respondent is inquired about the educational attainment of her father. Three categories are available: less than High
school, completed High school and more than High school. The reference category is ￿ less than High school￿ .
Family background: The respondent is inquired about her family background. Three categories are available: Middle class, low class and neither
middle nor low class. The reference category is ￿ neither middle nor low class￿ .
B. Descriptive Statistics
43Table 11: Descriptive Statistics
Whole Sample Respondents
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Positive nominal return (PNR) 46.45 39.68 46.45 39.68
Past positive nominal return (pPNR) 68.07 37.7 68.44 37.73
Risk aversion (CARA) 39.11 3.58 39 3.77
Temporal preference 6.73 2.33 6.79 2.25
Age 48 17 47 16
% of the sample
Male 45.6 49.1
Married/living with a partner 63.2 66.6
Education:
High School or less 14.8 10.2
Less than college 62.2 62.3
College or more 23 27.5
Income (in e/year):
Less than 8,000 18.3 15.2
8,000-15,999 32.1 28.8
16,000-29,999 38.4 41.6
More than 30,000 11.2 14.4
Total wealth (in e):
Less than 39,999 21.3 23.3
40,000-149,999 29.1 28.9
150,000-449,999 30.4 24.2
More than 450,000 19.2 23.6
Self management account 51.5 52
Financial advisor or other 6.1 5.9
Firm shares in remuneration 4.7 5.6
Parents own stocks 31 33
Online banking 19.7 24.5
Liquidity constrained 43.6 41.1
Irregular income risk 10.2 10.1
Trust 5.57 5.55
Stockownership 30.7 37.5
No. of Observations 3,826 2,406
Source: TNS 2007.
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A. Elementary Theory
The standard two-asset model, in either its static (Arrow, 1965) or dynamic (Merton, 1969; Samuelson,
1969) version1, predicts that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for investing in the risky asset (￿i￿
t > 0) is
that its expected return, Ei
trt+1; exceeds the return of the riskless asset, r :
max
￿i
t2[0;wi
t]
Z Ri
max
Ri
min
ui[(1 + r)wi
t + (rt+1 ￿ r)￿i
t]pi(rt+1jrt)drt+1
FOC: Ei
tf(rt+1 ￿ r)u0
i[(1 + r)wi
t + (rt+1 ￿ r)￿i￿
t ]g = 0
Participation Condition: Ei
trt+1 ￿ r > 0
Conditional Demand Equation: ￿i￿
t ￿ =
Ei
trt+1 ￿ r
Ai
u(wi
t)￿2
it
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1The dynamic (life-cycle) versions that produce a myopic (independent of the investment horizon) optimal share
of wealth invested in risky assets, necessitate in addition, that log-returns are normally distributed, independent and
identically distributed through time, and investors￿preferences in the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class.
See Brandt (2010) for a detailed explosition.Figure 1: Conditional Subjective Expectation by Age, TNS 2007.
where Ei
tf:g denotes the subjective expectation of the decision maker i conditional on his individual in-
formation set, Ii
t: Individuals are fully characterized by their preferences, ui; initial wealth endowments,
wi
t; and beliefs, Ei
tf:g ￿ Ef:jIi
tg; over the available investment opportunities rewarding time, r; and risk
and time, rt+1: Conditional on the reward for bearing risk being positive (Ei
trt+1 ￿ r > 0), investors then
allocate more or less of their wealth to the risky asset (￿i￿
t ) depending on how much do they distaste risk,
represented by the absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient, Ai
u(wi) ￿ ￿
u00
i (wi
t)
u0
i(wi
t) . Risk itself is summarized by the
subjective variance of the risky asset return, ￿2
it:
In this work we are only interested in the participation condition. For an estimation of the demand for
risky assets at both the intensive and extensive margins, see Arrondel et al. (2013).
The conditional subjective expectation
We extract the information component from subjective expectations, by regressing expectations (PNRi)
on information (pPNRi), and recover the predicted residuals, b ￿i; which are plotted by age in Figure 1.
For all ages, the regression summary statistics are:
PNRi = 21:57
(1:65)
+ 0:40
(0:021)
pPNRi + ￿i; R2 = 0:15
N=2;066
If we replace PNR and pPNR in the main equations by the predicted residuals, b ￿i; they are statistically
signi￿cant only for the young, conditional on all other covariates. These results are available upon request.
2B. Inspecting the Data
How do answers to the forwad-looking return expectations (Figure 2) and return realizations
question (Figure 3) compare ￿ for the same four respondents?
Figure 2: Individual histograms of respondents￿answers to survey question qc6 (PNR). Source: TNS 2007.
Histograms of CAC 40 index historical log returns
The density of nominal yearly (and 5-year rolling) log returns on the CAC-40 computed from monthly
data between July 1987 and July 2011 is depicted in Figure 4, panel (a) (panel (b)). The distribution has
sample moments ￿ = 0:023 (￿(5) = 0:108) and ￿ = 0:10 (￿(5) = 0:19). The densities depicted in Figure
4 can be thought as representing the subjective beliefs of those respondents who base them on the history
of observed stock market index monthly closing values.
Missing/Erroneous answers to the expectations question
In Table 1, we estimate a Probit speci￿cation for erroneous or missing answers (1 if answer to qc6 missing
or does not add up to 100) as a function of stockholding, and covariates (gender, marital status, education,
risk preference).
3Figure 3: Individual histograms of responses to the survey question C9 (pPNR). Source: TNS 2007.
Figure 4: Histogram of CAC-40 index log-returns, computed at 1-year (panel a) and 5-year (panel b) rolling
window frequencies. Source: Author￿ s own calculations using monthly data between July 1987 and July 2011,
available online from MSN Money.
4Table 1: Probability of Missing or Erroneous Answers - Marginal E⁄ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stockholding -0.202*** -0.198*** -0.193*** -0.170*** -0.158***
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0164) (0.0167)
Male -0.0792*** -0.0697*** -0.0712*** 0.0774***
(0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0161)
Married/living with a partner -0.0668*** -0.0718*** -0.0614***
(0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0170)
Education (Ref. category: High school or less)
Less than college -0.168*** -0.172***
(0.0228) (0.0229)
College or more -0.256*** -0.258***
(0.0208) (0.0208)
Temporal preference -0.0149***
(0.00296)
Pseudo R-squared 0.0293 0.0343 0.0375 0.0601 0.0651
Chi-squared 148.1 173.2 189.4 303.3 328.8
Log-likelihood -2449 -2437 -2429 -2372 -2359
No of observations 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,826
Note: (i) Standard errors are in parentheses. (ii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: TNS 2007.
C. Additional Data Validation Results
Table 2 reproduces Table 1 in Dominitz and Manski (2007) for all ages, reporting the distribution of
responses and the response rate conditioning on age, gender, and marital and stockholding status. Consistent
with their ￿ndings, the mean percentage chance of a positive nominal return is higher for respondents who are
married. The di⁄erential is 1.4 percentage points for men (50.1% versus 48.7%), while for females, it is only
1.1 percentage points (43.7% versus 42.6%). Figure 5 shows that also in France, males are more optimistic
than females. Even when conditioning on marital and stockholding status and for all age brackets, men give
more optimistic reports than do women, and are 6-7 percentage points more likely to give a response.
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Figure 5: Mean PNR by age and gender. Source: TNS 2007.
In line with the HRS 2002 ￿ndings by KØzdi and Willis (2009), expectations (noisily) increase with the
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Figure 6: Mean percentage chance of a positive nominal return over the next 5 years (PNR) by total wealth.
Source: TNS 2007.
respondent￿ s education and households￿total wealth. Figure 6 (7) displays kernel-smoothed estimates of the
mean percentage chance of a positive nominal return conditional on total wealth (educational attainement).
The solid curve depicts point estimates and the grey area around it represents (bootstrap) 95% con￿dence
intervals. The median of total wealth is e118,792, and the 90th percentile e413,476. We excluded 42
households with wealth above e800,000. The richest households (with wealth above the 90th percentile),
appear more optimistic regarding the future evolution of the stock market. An increase in wealth from the
10th to the 90th percentile, is estimated to increase the mean percentage chance of a positive nominal return
by about 2 to 3 percentage points.
Figure 7 compares by age, the mean percentage chance of a positive nominal return of respondents with
some college education or more relative to those having at most completed high school. Broadly, the former
seem to be slightly more optimistic than the latter, although both tend to similarly become more optimistic
as they age.
Table 3 reports both table 2 in Dominitz and Manski (2007) and our replication using instead data from
the TNS 2007 survey, for respondents in the same age bracket (50-80 years old). Figure shows that among
the 50-80 year-olds, the probability of holding stocks is increasing in the percent chance of a positive Stock
Market return, albeit in a more volatile way than in the US, since we have less observations.
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Figure 7: Mean percentage chance of a positive nominal return over the next 5 years (PNR) by educational
attainement. Source: TNS 2007.
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9D. Additional Descriptive Evidence on Information (pPNR)
Table 4 reports the distribution of responses and the response rate conditioning on age, gender and
stockholding status. In accordance with the ￿ndings reported in Lusardi (2008) on the ￿nancial literacy of
US adults, male respondents who are older, single and stockholders report higher mean (and a lower standard
deviation of) percentage chances of a past positive nominal return. The di⁄erential is 11.4 percentage points
higher for men than for women. Although information broadly increases with age, irrespective of gender,
the uncertainty of the reports decrease with age for males, while for females, it remains broadly constant.
Stockholders report a higher mean by about 10 percentage points, and are around 6 percentage points more
likely to give a response. Figure 8 shows that males are broadly better informed than females.
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Figure 9 shows that information broadly increases until the 50th percentile of wealth (e118,792), remains
constant until the 90th percentile (e413,476), only to increase again albeit very heterogeneously. The richest
households (with wealth above the 90th percentile), may thus be more optimistic (and disagree more)
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11regarding the future investment opportunities because they are better (and more heterogeneously) informed.
Relative to non-participation amongst the most a› uent, and in line with Guiso and Jappelli￿ s (2005) ￿ndings,
heterogeneity in stock market information appears as a di⁄erent alternative to better private investment
opportunities (Heaton and Lucas, 2000) or taxation (Poterba, 2002), while encompassing the ability to
process it (Grinblatt et al., 2011), its sources (social interactions, Hong et al., 2004; trust, Guiso et al.,
2008) or more broadly, ￿nancial literacy (van Rooij et al., 2011). Figure 10 shows that information about
past stock market performance does not increase with own￿ s educational attainement, although it broadly
increases with age within educational groups.
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